Strategic alliance announcements and new venture stock market returns: signaling and resource-based perspectives on the effects of partner firm, new venture firm, and alliance characteristics by Holmes Jr, Robert Michael
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEW VENTURE STOCK 
MARKET RETURNS: SIGNALING AND RESOURCE-BASED PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE EFFECTS OF PARTNER FIRM, NEW VENTURE FIRM, AND 
ALLIANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
by 
R. MICHAEL HOLMES JR. 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Management 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEW VENTURE STOCK 
MARKET RETURNS: SIGNALING AND RESOURCE-BASED PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE EFFECTS OF PARTNER FIRM, NEW VENTURE FIRM, AND 
ALLIANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
by 
R. MICHAEL HOLMES JR. 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Co-Chairs of Committee,  Michael A. Hitt 
R. Duane Ireland 
Committee Members,   S. Trevis Certo 
Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
Head of Department,   Murray R. Barrick 
 
 
 
December 2008 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Management 
 iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Strategic Alliance Announcements and New Venture Stock Market Returns: Signaling 
and Resource-based Perspectives on the Effects of Partner Firm, New Venture Firm, and 
Alliance Characteristics.  
(December 2008) 
R. Michael Holmes Jr., B.S., University of Alabama 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
  Dr. R. Duane Ireland 
 
 
 
Firms form marketing and technology alliances to access other firms’ resources, 
and these alliances act as signals to investors. Investors use these signals to adjust 
expectations about new venture performance prospects, but our understanding of 
investor responses is incomplete because limited research examines them as a function 
of factors other than the alliance announcements. To better understand alliances as 
signals, we must incorporate factors influencing the resources alliances make available. 
Thus, my research question is as follows: To what extent do partner firm, focal firm, and 
alliance characteristics provide signals to investors about the resources alliances make 
accessible? My theory integrates signaling theory and resource-based theory on strategic 
alliances, and an event study is used to analyze investor responses to alliances formed by 
high technology new ventures recently having undergone initial public offerings. 
The findings provide evidence both in support and in contradiction to signaling 
theory and resource-based theory on strategic alliances. For example, signaling theory 
logic suggests both that the visibility and prestige of large partners and that the 
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uncertainty associated with small and young firms enhance the strength of signals 
associated with alliance announcements. In this study, there is no support for the former 
hypotheses and limited support for the latter. Moreover, although both perspectives 
suggest that the new venture’s alliance experience increases investor responses, such 
effects were not found.    
There was some evidence to support the signaling theory argument that signal 
consistency strengthens responses. Specifically, investors respond favorably to 
marketing alliances when the new ventures’ alliance partners have strong commercial 
resources (many new products per year). There is also evidence that investors respond to 
the possibility of resource complementarity, contingent on which firm has the resources 
that complement the alliance. For instance, investors value marketing alliances when 
new ventures have strong R&D resources. In technology alliances, investors may 
respond more favorably when new ventures have strong commercial resources (high 
advertising intensity), but may respond negatively when partners have such resources. In 
sum, this study provides some support for signaling theory and resource-based theory on 
strategic alliances, but also provides null results that are inconsistent with either. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Question and Contribution 
The study of strategic alliances is an enduring theme in the organization sciences 
in general and in strategic management in particular. Strategic alliances are voluntary 
cooperative arrangements in which two or more firms share resources and adopt a 
governance structure to collaborate in the design and development, production, or 
marketing and distribution of goods and services (Das & Teng, 2000; Gulati, 1995; 
Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). Firms form alliances to gain access to tangible and 
intangible resources (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Oliver, 1990; Stuart, 
1998). Because young firms (henceforth, referred to as new ventures) often have 
otherwise limited access to resources, alliances are critically important to these firms 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and have been 
linked to performance advantages (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Stuart, Hoang, 
& Hybels, 1999). However, as alliances nearly always involve an element of competition 
among the partners (Amburgey, Dacin, & Singh, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2002), new ventures are also especially vulnerable to many of the negative 
consequences sometimes associated with alliances. For example, such firms can become 
overly dependent on their partners, are more at risk of being exploited by larger partners, 
and have fewer resources to invest in the ongoing management of alliances (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2001; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990). 
This dissertation follows the style of Academy of Management Journal. 
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Alliances not only provide potential access to alliance partners’ resources, but 
also signal firm quality to other resource providers (Podolny, 1994; Soh, Mahmood, & 
Mitchell, 2004), including prospective investors (Park & Mezias, 2005; Stuart et al., 
1999). As signals, alliances convey information about the resources to which a firm has 
access, perhaps reducing uncertainty about the firm’s performance prospects (Madhavan 
& Prescott, 1995; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004; Stuart, 2000). The argument that alliances are 
signals rests on research linking alliance formation announcements to stock market 
reactions (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; 
Woolridge & Snow, 1990). The underlying logic is that a new venture firm’s potential to 
generate desirable returns for shareholders is difficult to discern (Certo, 2003; Higgins & 
Gulati, 2006), prompting interested investors to search for observable signals thought to 
covary with this potential (Spence, 1974; Stuart et al., 1999). Thus, from the signaling 
firm’s perspective, the value of signals lies in the information they convey to outsiders 
and in the behavior they elicit from investors (Ang & Brau, 2003; Madhavan & Prescott, 
1995). This information is also important to investors, as it reduces uncertainty and 
improves confidence in a firm’s market performance prospects (Folta & Janney, 2004; 
Titman & Trueman, 1986).  
Nevertheless, understanding that alliances are signals is not equivalent to 
understanding the information alliances signal to investors. Stated differently, firms send 
multiple signals simultaneously (Ang & Brau, 2003; Madhavan & Prescott, 1995) and 
the receivers of such signals consider them in concert to more accurately discern the 
information they convey (Folta & Janney, 2004; Heil & Robertson, 1991). In particular, 
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many factors may influence the information alliances signal to investors, particularly 
with respect to the resources they potentially make available to new ventures.   
For instance, there is evidence from the IPO literature that the number of 
strategic alliances formed by new ventures has negligible effects on performance at 
initial public offering (IPO) (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). 
However, when partners are differentiated based on their tangible and intangible 
resources, scholars have found that new ventures get to IPO quicker and generate more 
capital at IPO when they maintain alliances with leading firms that have especially 
valuable resources (Chang, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999). In this sense, the resources of some 
alliance partners may provide signals that attract investors to these firms. In addition, 
scholars point out that both the types of alliances formed (i.e., marketing and 
technology) and the resources of alliance partners have important performance 
implications (Das & Teng, 2000; Stuart, 2000). In the biotechnology industry, for 
example, there is evidence that alliances targeting specific value chain activities 
stimulate new venture development (Calabrese, Baum, & Silverman, 2000; Walker, 
Kogut, & Shan, 1997), and the resources of alliance partners may be a key source of firm 
innovation (Baum et al., 2000; Powell et al., 1996). An extension of this reasoning 
suggests some resources may be more valuable in some types of alliances than others. 
Despite this possibility, research on the stock market’s reaction to alliances 
generally considers alliance type (Chan et al., 1997; Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998) and 
partner resources (Chang, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999) in relative isolation from the other. 
Moreover, research on investor responses to the resources available for new ventures to 
contribute to their alliances is virtually non-existent. This neglect is problematic because 
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a firm’s current resources affect its attractiveness as an alliance partner (Colombo, Grilli, 
& Piva, 2006; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994; Stuart, 1998) and its overall ability to 
benefit from alliances (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). In 
short, because research on market reaction to alliances generally incorporates one or a 
small number of such characteristics into a given study, our knowledge of the 
information alliances can signal to investors about a new venture’s resources and 
earnings prospects is underdeveloped.  
To more fully understand the signals alliances convey, we must move beyond 
studying alliance formation as a dichotomous event by incorporating (a) partner firm, (b) 
focal firm, and (c) alliance characteristics that influence the resources alliances make 
available (Park & Mezias, 2005; Stuart, 2000). I adopt this approach in the present study 
and propose the following research question: How and to what extent do specific partner 
firm, focal firm, and alliance characteristics provide signals to investors about the 
resources alliances make accessible to new ventures? To answer this question, my theory 
draws from and integrates insights from both signaling theory and resource-based theory 
on strategic alliances. The primary contribution lies in improving knowledge of investor 
reaction to a new venture’s alliances by analyzing the resources these alliances can make 
available to the new venture and the potential signals about the firm’s performance 
potential that such access conveys.  
Empirical Setting 
Firms having recently undertaken initial public offerings (IPOs) serve as the 
empirical setting for this research. An IPO transitions a firm from private to public 
ownership by offering tradable shares of the firm’s stock to external investors for the 
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first time. Importantly, the IPO firms that are the focus of this study are young firms, as 
defined in prior literature on IPO firms (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Certo, 
Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). This setting is appropriate for at least three reasons.  
First, as noted, strategic alliances are critically important to the success of new 
ventures, such as many IPO firms, which are often resource-constrained. Indeed, when 
alliances are announced, there is evidence that investors often react more positively for 
younger and smaller firms than for older and larger firms (Das et al., 1998; Koh & 
Venkatraman, 1991; Stuart, 2000). Furthermore, IPOs typically provide new ventures 
with an influx of financial capital (Florin, Lubatkin, & Schultz, 2003; Nelson, 2003) and 
may also increase legitimacy and social capital (Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 1997; 
Ravasi & Marchisio, 2003). Such resources may help firms attract new alliances (Ahuja, 
2000a; Oliver, 1990). Thus, the transition from private to public entity may increase the 
options available for alliance formation in post-IPO new ventures.   
Second, although the stock price of many IPO firms tends to rise on the first day 
of trading, they often underperform relative to the market in subsequent years (Certo, 
Holmes, & Holcomb, 2007; Ritter & Welch, 2002). One possible explanation is that 
IPOs fundamentally transform a firm, introducing new owners and other stakeholders, 
more stringent financial reporting and accountability, and altered organizational 
structures (Certo, 2003; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995). Such 
disruptions in firm operations can create new uncertainties and challenges that can have 
negative effects of subsequent firm performance (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; 
Hannan & Freeman; 1977; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). In post-IPO firms, for 
example, there is evidence that market to book ratios (MTB), price to earnings ratios 
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(PE), earnings per share (EPS) (Jain & Kini, 1994) may decline, and shareholder returns 
may be negative in the years following IPO (Florin, 2005). Also, some firms do not 
survive the transition (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). Thus, 
post-IPO firms may be motivated to seek out alliances to help navigate this 
transformation. Assessing investor responses to new venture alliance formation may 
improve our understanding of the resources and signals associated with this activity. 
Third, as the above discussion implies, despite disclosure of information during 
the IPO, investors often remain highly uncertain about the futures of these firms. Their 
limited histories and previously private nature produce information asymmetry that 
makes it difficult for investors to value them (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Higgins & Gulati, 
2006). Investors are aware and perhaps wary of the risks associated with post-IPO new 
ventures (Carpenter et al., 2003; Mudambi & Treichel, 2005). The liquidity generated 
during the IPO (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995) allows investors to react to announcements 
related to a new venture’s strategy by trading the stock, thereby influencing the firm’s 
market value. Thus, the importance of communicating strategy to market investors 
(Madhavan & Prescott 1995) is especially relevant in these firms. Because alliances can 
signal information about the resources to which a firm has access (Podolny, 1994; Stuart 
et al., 1999), investors are likely attuned to this aspect of a new venture’s strategy.  
This proposal proceeds as follows. The theory development chapter immediately 
follows. This chapter briefly describes the IPO process, introduces signaling theory and 
resource-based theory on alliances, and applies an integrative perspective to the present 
study. In this chapter, I also described the resources that specific alliance types and 
governance structures make available to new ventures and the potential signals such 
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access conveys. The third chapter contains specific hypotheses that codify the 
dissertation’s theoretical arguments. These hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1. The 
methodological approach proposed to test these hypotheses is presented in the fourth 
chapter. The fifth chapter contains the results. In the sixth chapter, implications, 
limitations, and future research directions are discussed. 
FIGURE 1  
Hypothesized model 
 
 
Event Study
Value Weighted 
1-Day, 3-Day, and 
7-Day CARs
Technology Alliances
Partner R&D resources (H2; +)
Partner size (H4; +)
New venture R&D resources (H6; +)
New venture uncertainty (H8; +)
New venture alliance experience (H10;+)
Complementarity (H12; +)
Marketing Alliances
Partner commercial resources (H1; +)
Partner size (H3; +)
New venture commercial resources (H5; +) 
New venture uncertainty (H7; +)
New venture alliance experience (H9;+)
Complementarity (H11; +)
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Initial Public Offerings 
Extraordinary growth in initial public offering (IPO) activity and publicity during 
the 1990’s accompanied a sharp rise in the study of IPO firms by strategic management 
scholars. IPO firms are important, both because of the economic activity they generate in 
the short-term and because they are likely to significantly influence future economic 
activity in the long-term. For example, according to Thompson Corporation data, 1,148 
IPOs were completed from 1999 to 2003; the gross proceeds of these offerings totaled 
$198 billion (PWC, 2004). Also, many of today’s leading firms are public companies 
and therefore undertook an IPO at some point in their histories, further underscoring the 
importance of studying IPOs.  
Recently, scholars have begun to complement earlier research on the short-term 
(i.e., first day) performance of IPO firms by extending the analysis to explain the long-
term performance of such firms by studying them in the years following IPO. In 
particular, scholars have employed signaling theory (Janney & Folta, 2006) and 
resource-based theory (Wang & Ang, 2004) to explain post-IPO performance outcomes. 
Florin and his colleagues (2003) employed social capital theory to explain post-IPO 
performance, but their theory was only tangentially related to strategic alliances, their 
empirical analysis only used a count measure of alliances embedded in an index of other 
social capital variables, and their dependent variables were accounting measures. Thus, 
despite applicability of signaling theory and resource-based theory to post-IPO new 
ventures and strategic alliances, scholars have yet to use the approach presented herein 
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to study relationships among the alliances these firms form and their performance in the 
years following IPO. 
The process of undergoing an initial public offering begins by registering with 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and drafting the IPO prospectus (Ellis, 
Michaely, & O’Hara, 2000). The prospectus is stringently regulated and provides 
detailed information about the firm (Certo et al., 2001); once filed, a firm cannot engage 
in activities to influence demand for its stock for approximately 25 days after the 
offering occurs (i.e., the quiet period, Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 2001). During this 
time, managers can visit potential investors in a series of road shows to discuss the 
firm’s operations, financials, products and services, future prospects, and so on (Certo, 
2003). Information not included in the prospectus is prohibited from being discussed at 
these meetings (Pollock, Porac, & Wade, 2004). Many of these meetings involve 
institutional investors, who represent a large and influential group of owners (Aggarwal, 
Prabhala, & Puri, 2002). Depending on market conditions, investor demand, and 
preferences of other stakeholders, the offer price, the number of shares to be sold, and 
the date on which the offering will occur are determined. Once the offering begins, the 
shares of the formerly private firm’s stock are sold to investors and the firm is 
henceforth a publicly-held entity with tradable shares.   
Signaling Theory 
Akerlof (1970) was one of the first to theoretically establish the existence of 
signals arguing that, without signals of product quality, product markets would not exist 
because customers would have little information with which to distinguish low quality 
from high quality products. Building on this idea, Spence (1973; 1974) articulated 
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signaling theory, arguing that signals are important sources of information when more 
objective information is unavailable. Subsequent work supports this idea, suggesting that 
signaling becomes more influential as uncertainty increases (Janney & Folta, 2006; 
Podolny, 1994; Stuart et al., 1999).   
Spence (1973; 1974) originally presented the theory in the context of job search. 
He suggested that education serves as a signal of an applicant’s future productivity (i.e., 
performance potential) and is therefore valued by prospective employers. Compared to 
higher quality applicants, lower quality applicants are likely to pursue less education 
because they find it more difficult, time consuming, and costly. Thus, the signal 
(education) conveys information that helps differentiate low quality applicants from high 
quality applicants. In providing such information, signals mitigate the potential for moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Folta & Janney, 2004; Janney & Folta, 2006). The 
reasoning has been extended to the firm level by Ross (1977), Milgrom and Roberts 
(1986), and Heil and Robertson (1991), among others. Generally, this body of work 
suggests that three conditions must hold for signals to be useful as a source of 
information.  
First, the signal must be observable. Simply, signals must be observable if they 
are to provide information about unobservable qualities. Indeed, Madhavan and Prescott 
(1995) found evidence that alliances are less valuable signals to investors when industry 
conditions make the signals difficult to receive and interpret. Second, the costs of 
creating the signal must be inversely proportional to the unobserved qualities the firm is 
attempting to signal. For example, as noted by Folta and Janney (2004), issuing private 
equity tends to generate higher returns than issuing public equity because private equity 
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investors must be certified by the SEC, are thought to be better evaluators and monitors, 
and cannot sell their shares for up to two years. Because these investors have both the 
incentive and the ability to perform thorough due diligence, lower quality firms find it 
difficult or prohibitively expensive to issue private equity. Thus, issuing private equity 
sends a signal to other investors that the issuing firm is worthy of investment. Third, and 
similarly, the signal must be inimitable for lower quality firms. Titman and Trueman 
(1986) explicate this condition in the context of IPOs, arguing that attracting quality 
investment bankers and auditors sends positive signals to other investors about the firm’s 
performance prospects because less promising firms are unlikely to attract such 
reputable parties to manage the offering. 
When all of these conditions hold, the signal is credible and creates a separating 
equilibrium that differentiates low quality and high quality firms (Janney & Folta, 2006; 
Ndofor & Levitas, 2004; Spence, 1974). This separating equilibrium is maintained until 
feedback disconfirms the perceived correlation between the signal and the unobserved 
qualities of interest (Spence, 1974). When signals cannot differentiate firms, a pooling 
equilibrium exists and signals are ineffective sources of information (Spence, 2002). 
Interestingly, Brau and Fawcett (2006) report that top managers recognize the value of 
signaling at IPO, and they perceive that historical earnings and investment banker 
certification are key signals. 
In studies of top management teams (TMTs), governance, and IPO firm 
performance, scholars have found evidence that investors evaluate multiple signals in 
conjunction (Certo et al., 2001; Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003; Florin et al, 
2003). According to signaling theory logic, signals are more valuable when there are 
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more of them, as the presence of many signals allows receivers to more accurately 
discern the information communicated (Lee, 2001). By evaluating many signals, 
receivers can compare and contrast the signals to identify consistent and inconsistent 
information, thereby improving interpretation (Folta & Janney, 2004; Heil & Robertson, 
1991). Moreover, signaling through multiple actions raises the costs of signaling, 
enhancing credibility further (Lee, 2001; Williamson, 1983). In short, as noted by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), the value and credibility of the signals firms send to 
outsiders is enhanced by the presence of other signals that not only raise the costs of 
communicating the information, but also support and confirm it. Thus, it is important for 
signaling theory research to consider multiple signals simultaneously. 
Finally, signals can convey negative information (Lee, 2001). For instance, 
signals that top managers are not receptive and open to new initiatives may prompt 
middle managers to withhold such proposals (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes, & 
Wierba, 1997). During IPO, top managers unloading their shares may signal potential 
agency problems that discourage investment in that firm (Ang & Brau, 2006). Similarly, 
the presence of founding CEOs may signal concentration of power in a firm’s original 
owners, increasing information asymmetry and perhaps leading investment bankers to 
discount the firm’s stock (Certo et al., 2001). 
Resource-based Theory on Strategic Alliances 
Because few firms have all of the resources necessary to compete, alliances are 
often used to gain access to the resources of other firms (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 
2002). Given resource-constraints, this argument is especially relevant in the context of 
new ventures. Alliances are attractive because they are less expensive than other means 
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of accessing external resources (e.g., acquisitions), are somewhat reversible, and may 
therefore allow firms to access resources as they are needed and/or for limited periods of 
time (Holcomb, Holmes, & Hitt, 2006; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991). As such, the most 
attractive alliances are those that allow access to the needed resources (Gulati, 1995; Hitt 
et al., 2000). Additionally, there is evidence that the resources accessed through alliances 
can improve firm performance outcomes, perhaps by helping each partnering firm to 
more fully leverage its existing endowment (Khanna et al., 1998; Lavie, 2006) and/or by 
attracting other desirable partners (Kelley & Rice, 2002; Powell et al., 1996). In support, 
the commercial and technological resources of alliance partners have been linked to 
superior performance on the first day of public trading (Stuart et al., 1999).  
Many applications of resource-based theory in the strategic alliance literature 
stress the importance of complementary resources. Complementary resources are 
different, yet mutually supportive (Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison, 2001a). The practice of 
combining strengths in marketing and distribution with externally accessed strengths in 
technology development is one example of potential complementarity (Harrison, Hitt, 
Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002). Another example is combining 
resources across market segments to generate and leverage broader and more unique 
products and service offerings that enhance competitiveness across segments (Cantwell, 
2001; Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000).  
Complementary resources have the potential to generate greater profits 
collectively than either set of resources can separately (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). The value of complementarity is grounded in the argument that the 
market prices resources according to their current uses, making it difficult to profit by 
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purchasing resources and using them in well understood and anticipated ways (Barney, 
1986; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003). Building complementarity involves combining 
resources to perform tasks that are unanticipated by the resource market, and generating 
such complementarity often requires accessing external resources (Denrell, Fang, & 
Winter, 2003; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Importantly, inter-partner differences in 
markets served and resource endowments have the highest possibility of producing 
complementarity. One reason may be that similarity preserves and perhaps enhances 
existing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Ireland, 1991; Hitt et al., 2001a). Conversely, accessing different but similar markets and 
resources creates new learning opportunities (Lavie & Rosenkopf; 2006; Zahra & 
George, 2002) and the potential to produce valuable, unique, and inimitable synergies 
(Gulati, 1995; Harrison et al., 2001).   
Integrating Signaling Theory with Resource-based Theory on Strategic Alliances 
A key insight of signaling theory research is that a new venture’s relationships 
with high status stakeholders serve as endorsements of that firm. The argument that 
relationships signal endorsements is grounded in the idea that high status stakeholders 
avoid associations with lower quality firms because such allegiances potentially injure 
the superior reputations high status stakeholders have accumulated (Certo, 2003; Stuart 
et al., 1999). Although such reputation effects are one source of signal credibility, they 
are not the only source.  
Signals also provide information about the resources to which firms have access. 
For instance, Turban and Greening (1997) note that corporate social responsibility 
investments enhance a firm’s reputational resources and therefore improve its 
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attractiveness to potential employees. Signaling theory has also been used in competitive 
dynamics research to describe actions firms take to indicate commitment to a market, 
thereby discouraging rivals from attacking it. Specifically, by allocating significant 
resources to a given market, a firm signals a strong resource endowment relevant to that 
market and a willingness to protect such investments (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Hopkins, 
2003; Kreps & Wilson, 1982). Finally, Lee (2001) argued that firms changing their 
names to more strongly identify with the Internet (e.g., adopting “dot com” names) 
attract resources specifically suited to electronic commerce, and such firms pursuing 
other activities consistent with that commitment produce valuable signals that enhance 
access to those resources in the future. In support, she found that investors respond 
positively to such name changes, and combining them with other strategies suggesting a 
commitment to the Internet resulted in greater positive responses from investors.  
A central argument in the present work is that external relationships can provide 
signals about accessible resources. Extending Spence’s analysis beyond the evaluation of 
job applicant human capital, to the extent that acquiring education requires at least 
minimal interpersonal skills to interact with faculty, staff, and other students, a job 
applicant’s education can also provide information about his or her social capital. 
Moreover, the process of acquiring education can provide access to important social 
resources, such as contacts from other individuals associated with the focal institution, 
particularly if that institution is perceived to be prestigious (D’Aveni, 1990; Useem & 
Karabel, 1986). Therefore, from this perspective, signals provide information not only 
about human capital, but also about social capital (Certo, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006).  
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By affiliation, firms can sometimes benefit from the reputation and legitimacy of 
other firms (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Oliver, 1990). For new ventures, drawing on other 
firms for these resources can be valuable because, although important, they can be 
otherwise difficult to develop (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Certo, 2003; Zimmerman & Zeidtz, 
2002). Social affiliation with high status alliance partners may be especially valuable, as 
these firms are thought to be more selective and accurate in their evaluations of other 
firms and also have more partnering options at their disposal (Janney & Folta, 2006; 
Stuart, 2000). In a study of new venture firms, Reuber and Fischer (2003) support this 
argument, finding evidence that such firms seek out high status customers to signal an 
ability to serve demanding clients. The signal appears credible because the performance 
of these customers depends to some degree on the products and services provided by the 
new ventures. Since firm exits can hurt the performance of partners (Uzzi, 1997; in 
extreme cases, the survival partners are threatened when partners fail; Singh & Mitchell, 
1996), alliance formation can be a credible signal that at least one partner has confidence 
in the value-creating potential of the new venture’s resources. Thus, the ability to 
maintain stable trading relations may be a signal of a new venture’s competence. 
Similarly, Cook (1999) argues that trade credit (short-term accounts payable) can signal 
that other firms have confidence that an entrepreneurial firm has the financial resources 
to repay its liabilities. Because the two firms’ short-term performance outcomes are 
linked by such arrangements, the relationship serves as a signal of a new venture’s 
credit-worthiness, enhancing the firm’s access to more substantial bank loans.  
In further support, Davilla, Foster, and Gupta (2003) argued that venture capital 
investment provides a signal that the receiving firm has strong technological, financial, 
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and managerial resources, thereby enhancing the firm’s appeal to potential employees. 
Other work suggests that the prior work affiliations of an IPO firm’s TMT members and 
the prestige of its board members can signal competence and the potential to access 
valuable external resources (Certo, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Finally, as noted, 
Stuart and his colleagues (1999) found evidence that the commercial and technological 
resources of alliance partners provide signals that help firms go public faster and 
generate higher valuations at IPO. 
Strategic Alliances as Potential Signals to Investors 
Strategic alliances can serve as signals to investors about the resources to which 
new venture firms have access. First, alliances are observable. As noted, many studies 
have linked announcements of strategic alliance formation to changes in firm stock 
price, suggesting that investors observe and are attuned to firms’ alliances. Strategic 
alliances are also reported in various media, including newspapers and other periodicals, 
academic and investor databases, and public relations announcements. The second and 
third requirements are that the costs of the signal (i.e., alliance) must be inversely 
correlated with the firm’s performance potential and that the signal must be difficult for 
inferior firms to imitate. Generally, alliance formation may be less costly and more 
imitable than other strategic actions (Holcomb et al., 2006; Inkpen, 2001), but alliances 
with prominent organizations are much less so. Again, the logic is that such alliances are 
more costly and less imitable than other alliances because prominent organizations are 
presumed to be more selective and reliable in partner selection evaluations and probably 
have more alternatives with which to partner. Because the commercial and technological 
resources of alliance partners are vital for many new venture firms, these resources 
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indicate the prominence of a given partner (Folta & Janney, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Similarly, larger firms and those covered intensely by the media are thought to be 
leading firms that make desirable partners for new ventures (Chang, 2004; Stuart, 2000). 
Moreover, investors using a new venture’s strategic alliances to infer its performance 
potential may also consider the types of alliances it forms, its existing resource 
endowment (Das et al., 1998; Park, Mezias, & Song, 2004), and other characteristics, 
such as its size and current markets (Chan et al., 1997; Park & Mezias, 2005).  
Prior research employing event study methodology indicates that investors use 
information about a firm’s alliances to adjust expectations about its performance 
potential, as evidenced by changes in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon the 
announcement of alliances. This approach is also employed in the present study. Event 
study methodology is intended to capture market reaction to an announced event that 
was previously unexpected (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The extent to which security 
prices change upon announcement of the unexpected event reflects its magnitude, as 
perceived by investors (Brown & Warner, 1980). Typically, the change is evaluated 
relative to the given security’s historical performance, and differences are referred to as 
abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997). It follows that positive and negative stock price 
movements imply positive and negative investor reactions, respectively, to the 
information conveyed by the announcement (Lee, 2001).  
Research on the short-term performance of IPO firms typically terminates the 
analysis after the first day of trading. Traditional finance and economic theory suggests 
that investor reaction to signals is captured in the returns generated at IPO. Common 
dependent variables include underpricing (the difference between the stock’s closing and 
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opening prices on the first day of trading; Certo et al., 2001; Cohen & Dean, 2005), net 
proceeds raised at IPO (the financial resources retained by the IPO firm, less costs 
incurred during the offering; Florin et al., 2003; Gulati & Higgins, 2003), and the 
percent price premium at IPO (the price at which the firm’s stock goes on sale to 
investors at the beginning of the first day of trading less book value, with this difference 
divided by the offer price; Certo et al., 2003; Nelson, 2003).  These dependent variables 
are the outcome of a price-setting process involving institutional investors, prominent 
individual investors, underwriters, the IPO firm, and other stakeholders (Aggarwal & 
Conroy, 2000; Certo et al., 2003; Pollock et al., 2004). The evaluative process is lengthy 
and includes extensive analysis of the IPO firm’s performance prospects, as evidenced 
by its management, strategy, structure, governance characteristics, and so on (Certo, 
2003; Titman & Trueman, 1986; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996).  
Using event study methodology to examine accumulated investor reaction during 
such a long time period is not advisable, as this approach increases the possibility that 
extraneous factors (e.g., dividend changes, earnings announcements, etc.) confound the 
link between the announcement of interest and the market’s response (Bromiley, 
Govekar, & Marcus, 1988). Conversely, if CARs are constructed to reflect short-term 
market reaction to an alliance announcement, they can be interpreted as the market’s 
collective estimation of the marginal value associated with that alliance. Thus, although 
related, CARs has different generative mechanisms and is a fundamentally different 
dependent variable than measures targeting short-term performance at IPO. Accordingly, 
research results on such short-term market performance, though valuable, cannot be 
assumed to generalize to market performance following IPO. 
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Strategic Alliance Types as Signals of Accessible Resources 
 Drawing on signaling theory and resource-based theory on alliances, this work 
examines investor reaction to different types of alliances by segmenting them into those 
associated primarily with marketing activities and those associated primarily with 
technology development (Park & Mezias, 2005). Building on the argument that 
investors, including those evaluating firms undergoing or having recently undergone an 
IPO, consider multiple signals to assess firm quality (Ang & Brau, 2003; Folta & 
Janney, 2004; Madhavan & Prescott, 1995), the effects of alliance types and partner 
characteristics are considered in combination. In particular, as noted, the analysis 
includes new venture firm and partner firm characteristics that influence the resources 
certain alliances make available, potentially providing insight into the impact of a new 
venture’s alliances as signals of accessible resources. 
To study alliance types, strategic management scholars are increasingly drawing 
on Porter’s (1985) concept of the value chain. A stimulant to this approach is research 
suggesting that new ventures forming alliances targeting specific primary value chain 
activities (primary activities directly create value and include marketing and research 
and development activities, whereas secondary activities are those involving support 
services such as human resources and finance; Porter, 1991) can access resources from 
alliance partners that improve performance (Baum et al., 2000; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 
2002). The terminology used to refer to different types of alliances is inconsistent, but 
distinguishing alliances based on whether they perform downstream value chain 
activities or upstream value chain activities is fairly consistent from study to study. 
Henceforth, I use terminology consistent with that employed by Das and colleagues 
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(1998) and Park and Mezias (2005), referring to alliances that perform downstream 
activities as marketing alliances and alliances that perform upstream activities as 
technology alliances. In doing so, this dissertation responds to the call for more research 
incorporating this distinction into the study of IPO firms (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). 
 Marketing alliances are primarily concerned with stimulating customer demand 
through downstream value chain activities involving functions such as sales, 
distribution, and customer service (Das et al., 1998). In e-commerce firms, for example, 
specific activities include sharing sales forces, cross-selling, joint advertisement and co-
promotion, cooperation in the distribution of goods and services, and common customer 
loyalty programs (Evans & Wurster, 1999; Park et al., 2004). Rothaermel and Deeds 
(2006) use the term downstream alliances, noting that such alliances may also be used to 
confront regulatory obstacles in biotechnology. Hagedoorn (1993) suggests that these 
alliances are motivated by market access, which includes activities associated with 
monitoring the environment to search for and enter new product and geographic markets. 
Referring to exploitation alliances, Rothaermel (2001) argues that these alliances are 
associated with commercializing new products and services to exploit existing sources of 
competitive advantage. Interaction between the partners in a marketing alliance often 
involves the sharing of knowledge associated with sales figures, customer demand, 
forward supply chain conditions, and so on. Although some of this knowledge may be 
tacit, much of it is explicit and codifiable, reducing the difficulty of transferring it 
between the partners (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Zander & Kogut, 1995).  
 Technology alliances are concerned with developing new products and services 
and include research and development (R&D), engineering, and technology transfer 
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activities (Das et al., 1998). Referring to such alliances as exploration alliances, 
Rothaermel (2001) similarly notes that they can involve research, design, and discovery 
of novel products and services. According to Hagedoorn (1993), technology alliances are 
often intended to help firms cope with shortening technology life cycles by providing 
increased access to new technologies and reducing the costs and risks of basic and/or 
applied research. Indeed, Ahuja (2000b) found evidence that technology alliances in the 
chemicals industry provide technical knowledge that help firms improve their innovation 
efforts. Often, an additional purpose is combining multiple technologies, perhaps from 
different industries, to create more advanced products and services (Cantwell, 2001; 
Hagedoorn, 1993). However, technology investments may take a long time to 
materialize, can create uncertainty, and may increase the information asymmetry 
between firms and investors (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, 
& Grossman, 2002; Pisano, 1990). Exchanged knowledge, whether based on new 
applications of existing technology or on entirely new technology, may be highly tacit 
and difficult to transfer (Park et al., 2004; Teece, 1986). Interpersonal interaction and 
new or adapted knowledge sharing routines may be necessary, and these processes can 
be expensive, time consuming, and demanding (Lavie, 2006; Teece, 1986). Thus, in 
general, technology alliances may be somewhat more challenging to manage than are 
marketing alliances (Larson, 1992; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).  In addition, the 
potential to fail in technology alliances is high, and many never produce the intended 
benefits (Das & Teng, 1996; Park & Mezias, 2005; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). 
 Importantly, research using event study methodology suggests that stock market 
investors recognize and differentiate among the possible signals conveyed by these two 
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types of alliances. For instance, two studies by Park and his colleagues (Park et al., 2004; 
Park & Mezias, 2005) found that investors typically respond more favorably to 
marketing alliances than to technology alliances. In contrast, Das and colleagues (1998) 
and Chan and colleagues (1997) found evidence that investors respond more favorably 
to technology alliances than to marketing alliances. Thus, although evidence is mixed as 
to which alliance type is preferred by investors, that each study found differences in 
investor reaction suggests that investors do recognize the distinction between the 
benefits provided by marketing and technology alliances.  
This study will extend research on stock market reactions to marketing and 
technology alliances. Prior work incorporating factors that condition the value of these 
two types of alliances is limited. One example was reported by Park and Mezias (2004), 
who found that marketing alliances were more valuable as environmental munificence 
decreases. In a second example, Das et al. (1998) found that a firm’s profitability 
negatively affected the value of marketing alliances and that the relative difference in 
size among partners negatively affected the value of technology alliances. In the present 
research, additional theoretically important alliance, new venture firm, and partner firm 
variables are included.  
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
Alliance Partner Characteristics 
Building on the idea that selecting appropriate partners is often critical to alliance 
success (Hitt et al., 2000; Holcomb et al., 2006; Ireland et al., 2002), signaling theorists 
have found evidence that the information signaled by alliance formation depends to 
some extent on characteristics of the new venture’s partners (Chang, 2004; Park & 
Mezias, 2005). Signal receivers, including investors, interpret multiple signals by 
distinguishing among them and comparing the information they contain (Ang & Brau, 
2003; Spence, 1973). Consistency in signals helps establish credibility (Heil & 
Robertson, 1991; Lee, 2001). As such, investors analyzing a new venture’s alliances 
may also evaluate characteristics of its partners to better ascertain the information that 
such alliances convey. In this section, I present hypotheses relating the commercial and 
R&D resources of partners to the market performance experienced by new ventures 
upon the announcement of marketing and technology alliances, respectively. 
Commercial resources are those facilitating access to customers, distribution, and the 
ability to leverage product and service offerings profitably in customer markets. R&D 
resources are those associated with developing, designing, or otherwise creating new and 
innovative product and service offerings.  
Partners are heterogeneous with respect to the resources they control. Partners 
with strong commercial and technological resources are typically visible and prestigious 
firms (Stuart et al., 1999). Signaling theory suggests that affiliation with well-known 
firms provides a positive signal about the resources and performance potential of less 
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prominent firms (Reuber & Fischer, 2005). Because established firms allocating a 
significant portion of their financial resources to a given set of activities are more likely 
to be considered experts and leaders in such activities, investors may perceive that 
alliances with commercial and technological leaders allow new ventures to tap the 
superior resources and valuable experiences of these firms (Stuart, 2000). Further, 
partners can provide intangible resources, such as reputation and legitimacy, to less 
established organizations (Hitt et al., 2000; Oliver, 1990). Leading firms are thought to 
be less likely to partner with inferior firms, thereby providing a positive signal of a new 
venture’s prospects (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). As such, from a signaling perspective, 
consistency among a new venture’s alliance activities and the resource characteristics of 
its partners should provide valuable signals to investors. From a resource-based 
perspective, new ventures frequently search for alliance partners with valuable resources 
specialized to immediate needs (Doh, 2000). Not all resources are equally valuable, and 
alliances allowing partners to take advantage of their existing resource strengths should 
be more valuable (Ireland et al., 2002). In this sense, alliances with partners allocating 
significant financial resources in related areas suggest a higher likelihood of success 
(Lavie, 2006).  
Marketing Alliances and Partners’ Commercial Resources. In discussing partners’ 
commercial resources, marketing alliances, and short-term market returns, it is important 
to emphasize that firm performance depends not only on the ability to develop new 
product and service ideas, but also on the ability to commercialize them (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001; Rothaermel, 2001). Establishing customer bases by adeptly 
commercializing products and services is particularly vital for new ventures, but their 
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resource constraints hinder such efforts. By allowing new ventures to draw on the 
resources of other firms, marketing alliances are a way to address such challenges, 
especially when partners are especially strong in commercial activities. To investors, 
marketing alliances with commercially prominent partners may signal that new venture 
firms have promising opportunities to access new markets and customers (Park & 
Mezias, 2005; Stuart, 2000).  
Commercially prominent partners may have greater access to distribution 
channels and are more likely than other partners to have long standing relationships with 
superior customers (Stuart, 2000). Marketing alliances provide opportunities and 
incentives for partners to jointly collect and exchange information on customer demand. 
Such increased customer access and interaction can help new ventures improve their 
marketing efforts, perhaps by customizing existing product and service offerings and 
improving sales approaches to achieve greater penetration of both new and existing 
markets (Park et al., 2004). For instance, when a new venture’s alliance partners have 
especially valuable commercial resources, cooperating in activities such as sales, 
advertisement, and promotion (Das et al., 1998) helps new ventures draw from their 
partners’ reputation and legitimacy (Oliver, 1990) to attract new customers. 
Commercially prominent partners may also have strong brand names, and new ventures 
are sometimes able to benefit from such resources (Evans & Wurster, 1999). Thus, 
marketing alliances with commercially prominent partners may help reduce investor 
uncertainty regarding a recently public firm’s future earnings by signaling access to 
resources that can help the firm achieve successful commercialization of its product and 
service offerings. 
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Hypothesis 1: The commercial resources of a new venture’s alliance 
partner are positively related to the new venture’s cumulative 
abnormal returns upon the announcement of a marketing alliance 
with that partner. 
 
Technology Alliances and Partners’ R&D Resources. The positive signals conveyed 
by technology alliances rest on the notion that all firms, particularly entrepreneurial 
firms, must be capable of learning and innovating to succeed in the modern economy 
(Franko, 1989; Hitt Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001b; Sarkar, Echambadi, Agarwal, & 
Sen, 2006). Through technology alliances, firms can monitor technological advances and 
access the technology of partners through the design and development of products and 
services (Chan et al., 1997; Hagedoorn, 1993; Rothaermel, 2001). In addition, reducing 
the costs and risks of R&D investment by sharing these activities in technology alliances 
(Hagedoorn, 1993) can be especially valuable to new ventures that often lack the 
necessary resources to engage in large scale R&D unilaterally. Technologically 
prominent partners likely have advanced and innovative resources from which the new 
venture can draw. Allying with such firms may therefore provide an especially valuable 
signal to investors about a new venture’s potential to develop novel products and 
services. In support, there is evidence that investors respond favorably to the 
technological resources of alliance partners on the first day of trading (Stuart et al., 
1999). 
Technologically advanced partners signal greater potential to capitalize on 
innovation opportunities (Stuart, 2000). Accessing especially valuable technical 
resources creates learning opportunities, which can enhance a new venture’s 
innovativeness in activities independent and subsequent to a focal alliance (Baum et al., 
2000; Kelley & Rice, 2002; Stuart, 2000). For instance, Stuart (2000) found that the 
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technological resources of alliance partners improved the innovativeness of 
semiconductor firms, and studies by Ahuja (2000b) and Rothaermel (2001) report 
similar results in the telecommunications industry and biotechnology industry, 
respectively. These results suggest that high technology firms can use their partners’ 
technologies to enhance the value of their own technologies. Such innovations, in turn, 
have been linked to superior firm performance (Wuyts, Dutta, & Stremersch, 2004). 
Hypothesis 2: The R&D resources of a new venture’s alliance 
partner are positively related to the new venture’s cumulative 
abnormal returns upon the announcement of a technology alliance 
with that partner. 
 
Literature suggests that the benefits potential investors perceive in alliance 
formation depend in part on the size of the partnering firms (Das et al., 1998). The next 
two hypotheses pertain to this argument. 
Pre-alliance partner selection processes can be extensive, involving assessment 
of potential partners' financial, managerial, and technological resources, market 
positions, alliance history, and so on (Hitt et al., 2000; Holcomb et al., 2006; Stuart, 
1998). These analyses provide opportunities for managers of the respective firms to meet 
with one another (Bamford, Ernst, & Fubini, 2004), which suggests that in depth 
evaluation is possible and occurs in many situations. This evaluation is important, given 
that the performance of partnering firms may become interdependent to some degree 
(Singh & Mitchell, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). Because large firms are thought to be superior 
evaluators with more partnering options at their disposal (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004; 
Stuart, 2000), an alliance with such a firm may be a positive signal of the new venture’s 
performance prospects. Indeed, extending the argument that highly legitimate top 
managers and board directors avoid investing their human capital in firms with poor 
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performance prospects (Certo, 2003; Cohen & Dean, 2005), large and prominent alliance 
partners are also likely to avoid partnering with such firms.  
Marketing Alliances with Large Partners. Marketing alliances with large and 
established partners may be an especially valuable signal for new ventures. For reasons 
similar to those underlying the positive signals associated with attracting high status 
customers (Reuber & Fischer, 2005), a marketing alliance with a well-established 
organization may signal that a new venture is capable of reliably engaging in large-scale 
marketing activities across a sizable customer base. Moreover, large organizations are 
often the most visible and legitimate players in the environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Haveman, 1993). Thus, participating in a marketing alliance with a leading 
organization may give credibility to the new venture’s marketing efforts, perhaps 
attracting future customers and investors.  
Moreover, investors in new ventures may be specifically concerned with their 
ability to generate income (Florin, 2005). Thus, they often value marketing alliances that 
provide increased access to revenue streams in the short-term (Park & Mezias, 2005). 
Partnering with large firms helps provide a new venture access to sizable and relatively 
stable revenue streams on which it can attempt to grow its own sales base (Stuart, 2000). 
When such firms have access to additional resources to facilitate cash-generating 
exploitation of product and service offerings, investors may respond favorably as 
concerns about cash flows are alleviated (Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). Since 
large firms are presumed to have access to more of such resources, marketing alliances 
with these firms may be a positive signal of a new venture’s future earning potential.    
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Hypothesis 3: The size of a new venture’s alliance partner is 
positively related to the new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of a marketing alliance with that firm. 
 
Technology Alliances with Large Partners. As noted, the returns to technology 
investments often take a long time to materialize and there may be uncertainty regarding 
whether or not they will eventually do so (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Pisano, 1990). Thus, 
although innovative activities are vital to the success of new ventures in high technology 
industries, these activities also create information asymmetries between the firm and 
external stakeholders (Coff, 2003). Indeed, at IPO, investors sometimes discount the 
stocks of firms with strategies heavily dependent on research and development, 
especially when there are concerns about the ability to appropriate the value created 
through such activities (Heeley et al., 2007). Moreover, Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 
(1994) argued that entrepreneurial firms often have inadequate resources to realize the 
full performance potential of these alliances. From this perspective, technology alliances 
may sometimes add to investor uncertainty because of the need for autonomous 
organizations to cooperate in an already ambiguous set of activities involving products 
and services that may be far from commercialization (Das & Teng, 1998; Folta & 
Janney, 2004; Rothaermel, 2001).  
Partnering with large firms may help address investor concerns about a new 
venture’s technological activities and performance prospects. The visibility, status, 
reputation, and history of leading firms may be an information source that allows 
outsiders to accurately gauge these firms’ behaviors and resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Typically, there is more publicity associated with the 
actions of large firms, enhancing the quality and strength of communicated signals, as 
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the link between them and firm reputations is more explicit (Heil & Robertson, 1991; 
Ross, 1977). Forming an alliance with a large and established partner communicates that 
at least one firm has evaluated and is comfortable with the new venture’s innovative 
potential. Finally, the well-developed revenue streams and customers bases of large and 
established firms (Stuart, 2000) may provide both the incentive and the ability for the 
partners to succeed through innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). Accordingly, by 
alleviating some of the information asymmetry associated with technology alliances, the 
presence of a large partner may improve investor reactions to them.  
Hypothesis 4: The size of a new venture’s alliance partner is 
positively related to the new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of a technology alliance with that firm. 
 
New Venture Characteristics 
Investor reactions to the information signaled by a new venture’s alliances may 
depend on more than the characteristics of its alliance partner. In this section, new 
venture characteristics that may influence the signals conveyed by its alliances are 
examined. 
As noted, signaling theorists argue that multiple signals communicating 
consistent information help reinforce one another, potentially increasing the cost of 
signaling and improving investor confidence in the reliability of the signaled information 
(Folta & Janney, 2004; Heil & Robertson, 1991). Signaling through controllable actions, 
such as financial resource allocation and alliance formation, also makes the signals more 
observable and tangible, improving the receiver’s ability to accurately gauge the 
signaler’s intentions and priorities (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Lee, 2001). Thus, new 
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ventures may have an interest in sending additional signals to complement or otherwise 
enhance the quality of the information conveyed though alliance formation.  
A new venture allocating its scarce resources to independently perform activities 
similar to those performed in its alliances may provide strong signals to investors. Such 
spending suggests an opportunity to build at least a basic understanding of those 
activities shared with partners, enhancing the likelihood that learning will occur (Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998). Such learning helps the focal firm access the resources of its partner, 
perhaps improving the value created by the given alliance (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In 
addition, learning creates opportunities to leverage the resources provided by alliances in 
other endeavors and may therefore facilitate subsequent improvements in firm 
performance (Khanna et al., 1998). Investing a firm’s limited resources in activities 
similar to those jointly performed with alliance partners also signals management 
priorities, enabling better mobilization and coordination of internal and alliance-related 
efforts associated with those priorities (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Pfeffer, 1981). Similarly, 
investors may perceive that alliances targeting specific areas in which the focal firm has 
strengths are more likely to generate benefits associated with relatedness, such as market 
power and efficiency, and therefore respond by valuing such alliances higher in the 
market (Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant & Schendel, 2000).  
Marketing Alliances and New Ventures’ Commercial Resources. There is evidence 
that investors respond positively to increases in the commercial resource investments 
made by new ventures, perhaps because such investments accumulate and signal that the 
firm is leveraging prior investments by building on them (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). Stated 
differently, significant resource allocations to marketing activities may improve investor 
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confidence in the performance potential of future commitments in marketing, especially 
when such investments create the potential to access new resources in this area. 
Moreover, heavy investment in commercial resources signals strength in downstream 
value chain activities, potentially improving marketing alliance partnering options and 
the likelihood that valuable synergies will materialize. Conversely, firms with weak 
commercial resource endowments may have difficulty attracting partners in high 
technology industries (Ahuja, 2000a).  
In addition, effective learning is more likely in areas close to a firm’s existing 
strengths (Levinthal & March, 1993), so a new venture’s strength in commercial 
resources potentially increases the likelihood of learning from a marketing alliance. 
Acquired knowledge resources can be combined with the firm’s existing commercial 
strengths to pursue new opportunities. Also, a new venture with stronger commercial 
resource endowments may be capable of contributing more to its marketing alliances 
than can a new venture with weaker commercial resources, potentially improving the 
former’s ability to appropriate an equitable share of the value created (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2001; Hamel, 1991). In support of these arguments, research suggests that 
marketing alliances are positively related to post-IPO sales growth for firms with 
strategies dependent on marketing (McGee, Dowling, & Megginson, 1995).  
Hypothesis 5: The commercial resources of a new venture firm are 
positively related to the new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of a marketing alliance.  
 
Technology Alliances and New Ventures’ R&D Resources. Related logic suggests 
that the R&D resources of a new venture firm’s alliance partners may affect the returns it 
generates from the announcement of technology alliances. Firms with more innovation-
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oriented strategies tend to form more technology alliances (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996; Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). One reason is that such investments improve 
partnering options by signaling innovative potential (Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 1998). 
Technologically competent firms are also in a better position to use the resources 
accessed through technology alliances to enhance the productivity of other R&D 
activities not directly related to such alliances (Powell et al., 1996).  
Nonetheless, learning through these alliances is usually difficult because 
technologies are often highly tacit, making them difficult to transfer without close 
interaction (Chen & Holmes, 2006; Teece, 1986). However, when new ventures already 
have strong technological resources, they may have the absorptive capacity necessary to 
learn from future investments in technology (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), including 
technology alliances (Bayona, Garcia-Marco, & Huerta, 2001). Accessing such 
knowledge from alliance partners may enhance a firm’s ability to learn and innovate in 
future endeavors, but an inability to learn can sacrifice such opportunities (Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra & George, 2002). These deficiencies can in turn reduce a new 
venture’s future competitiveness (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000).  
Moreover, as noted, technology alliances provide a new venture with 
opportunities to access its partners’ innovative capabilities and also serve as a signal to 
investors that it is involved in actions to improve its technological competence. As such, 
benefiting from technology alliances requires investing sufficient resources to support 
these alliances and give them a meaningful chance of success (Bayona et al., 2001; 
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). The extent to which a new venture can remain 
valuable to its partners by repeatedly contributing valuable technology to the alliance 
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also helps the firm appropriate the profits generated if the alliance succeeds (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2001). In support, there is evidence that new ventures demonstrating quality 
technology resources attract more technology alliance partners and subsequently become 
more innovative (Kelley & Rice, 2002; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998). Thus, 
there are several reasons to expect a positive relationship between a new venture’s R&D 
resources and investor responses to an announced technology alliance. 
Hypothesis 6: The R&D resources of a new venture firm are 
positively related to the new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of a technology alliance.  
 
Signaling is more valuable to both the sender and the receiver when a relative 
lack of objective information creates uncertainty and information asymmetry (Lee, 2001; 
Spence, 1973). As noted, the previously private and short histories of new ventures 
deprive investors of objective information, producing uncertainty and information 
asymmetry (Certo, 2003; Folta & Janney, 2004). This problem is more acute in smaller 
and younger firms, enhancing the importance of signals as a source of information on 
such firms (Podolny, 1994; Stuart, 2000). Although IPO firms may generate visibility 
and media attention (Pollok, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008; Ravasi & Marchisio 2003), the 
entrepreneurial nature of many such firms limits opportunities for media exposure. 
Further, though important, disclosed financial statements provide an incomplete picture 
of a new venture’s resources, prompting investors to search for signals conveying such 
information.  
Small and young new ventures are typically associated with more uncertainty 
than their larger and older counterparts (Folta & Janney, 2004; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
Their external relationships are important because investors otherwise have difficulty 
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evaluating them (Certo, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999). Further, their size and age increases 
their susceptibility to failure, increasing the importance of external relationships further 
(Baum & Oliver, 1992; Gulati & Higgins, 2003). 
Marketing Alliances and New Venture Uncertainty. Because of their limited assets, 
small new ventures may have difficulty establishing and maintaining stable customer 
bases. Young new ventures may have a similar problem because they have had less time 
to develop such bases. Marketing alliances can be especially valuable to these types of 
firms. Indeed, given the challenges small and young firms confront in the marketplace, 
the customers, distribution channels, and marketing-related knowledge potentially 
accessed through a marketing alliance (Das et al., 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993) may have a 
significant marginal impact on the competitiveness of these firms. Stated differently, 
relative to other firms, the marginal benefit of marketing alliances for small or young 
firms may be higher. In this sense, to the extent that investors are uncertain about the 
ability of new and young firms to generate income (Florin, 2005), accessing new 
markets and potential customers through a marketing alliance may be a valuable signal.  
Marketing alliances have other features that might be beneficial for small and 
young firms. Much of the knowledge exchanged in marketing alliances is less complex 
and tacit than is the knowledge exchanged in technology alliances (Park et al., 2004; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Information on market size, share, and trends may be 
directly codifiable. Sales and distribution activities may also be more routine-oriented 
and explicit than technical knowledge (Hagedoorn, 1993; Rothaermel, 2001, easing 
transfer (Teece, 1986; Zander & Kogut, 1995), and perhaps reducing the complexity of 
operating marketing alliances (Larson, 1992). For similar reasons, the benefits of these 
37 
 
alliances can often be realized rather quickly (Rothaermel, 2001). Similarly, because the 
performance of alliance partners is interdependent to some degree (Singh & Mitchell, 
1996; Uzzi, 1997), forming a marketing alliance suggests that another firm has 
confidence in the small or young firm’s marketing activities and performance potential. 
Hypothesis 7: The uncertainty associated with a new venture firm is 
positively related to the new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns 
upon the announcement of a marketing alliance. 
 
Technology Alliances and New Venture Uncertainty. As with customer bases and 
revenue streams, small and young firms may have difficulty building their technology 
portfolios and pipelines. The limited resources of small firms, coupled with the high 
costs of internal R&D and acquiring technology externally, can dampen opportunities 
for technological development. Also, establishing and having other firms accept a new 
venture’s technology can be time consuming and challenging, and younger firms have 
had a shorter horizon to do so. Thus, in a manner similar to that discussed above with 
marketing alliances, any accessed technologies, knowledge, and development 
opportunities (Das et al., 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993) may have a larger impact on the 
technical resources available to smaller and younger firms, relative to their larger and 
older counterparts. Accordingly, the uncertainty associated with the technologies of 
many small and young firms (Heeley et al., 2007) may lead investors to place greater 
weight on the signals associated with a technology alliance.  
 Moreover, although the technological development of many small and young 
firms may limit the benefits they receive from technology alliances (Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994), it is important to emphasize that such firms also have many 
advantages pertaining to such alliances. For instance, the informal and flexible 
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communications systems and performance incentives frequently found in small firms 
may help them attract technically competent R&D personnel (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). 
In addition, these characteristics of small and young new ventures may also increase 
their ability to absorb, distribute, and integrate technical knowledge within the firm, 
perhaps providing them a learning advantage (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000; Zahra, 
2005). Thus, despite the challenges that small and young firms confront, investors might 
also view technology alliances as promising opportunities to improve the firm’s 
technological position. In support, there is evidence that the smaller partner in 
technology alliances benefits more than does the larger partner (Das et al., 1998). 
Hypothesis 8: The uncertainty associated with a new venture firm is 
positively related to the new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns upon 
the announcement of a technology alliance. 
 
The next two hypotheses relate the alliance experience of new ventures with the 
cumulative abnormal returns associated with the announcements of marketing and 
technology alliances. Alliance experience is accumulated over time as firms engage with 
other firms in prior partnerships. Consistent with the argument that experience provides 
opportunities to learn to send better signals (Folta & Janney, 2004), Anand and Khanna 
(2000) found evidence that managers can utilize prior alliances to learn to create greater 
stock market value in subsequent alliances. Engaging in many alliances over time also 
creates some consistency and irreversibility in the activity, enhancing signal credibility 
(Heil & Robertson, 1991; Lee, 2001). Similarly, multiple prior alliance relationships 
may provide a useful signal about the performance potential of subsequent alliances.  
Marketing Alliances and Alliance Experience. Alliance experience may enhance the 
market’s response to the announcement of a marketing alliance. Managing alliances is 
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challenging (Ireland et al., 2002), especially for resource-constrained new ventures (Li & 
Atuahene-Gima, 2002). In particular, marketing alliances represent a vehicle for quickly 
leveraging existing resource and capability advantages in current or new markets (Das et 
al., 1998; Rothaermel, 2001). When market conditions change, partners must be able to 
quickly and effectively respond to maintain or enhance their positions (Lee & Grewal, 
2004). Therefore, inter-partner cooperation, speed, and flexibility are important. New 
ventures with significant alliance experience have a history of cooperation from which 
potential partners can ascertain cooperative strengths and weaknesses, perhaps 
contributing to better partner selection. Moreover, previous alliance experience may be a 
source of knowledge about how to manage alliances (Tsang, 1999; 2002). Thus, prior 
alliance experience may improve a new venture’s capacity to contribute productively to 
marketing alliances. Similarly, observing multiple alliances by a new venture may 
alleviate investor uncertainty regarding the extent to which the firm can interact 
productively with partners. 
Another advantage of marketing alliances is that they may provide access to 
customers in new product and geographic markets (Das et al., 1998; Park et al., 2004). 
New ventures with a well-established history of alliance participation become 
increasingly embedded in the social network of other firms, potentially gaining access to 
a large endowment of resources that can be leveraged through the focal marketing 
alliance (Powell et al., 1996; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). Moreover, engaging in many prior 
alliances may allow a new venture access to important market-related knowledge 
concerning, for example, new markets, emerging niches, maturing segments, and so on. 
Thus, through prior alliances and the contacts in other firms that result, alliance 
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experience can be a source of important knowledge that allows managers to more 
judiciously capitalize on the benefits a focal marketing alliance provides. By observing 
prior alliances, investors may be able to gather better information about the new 
venture’s potential to leverage the benefits of a new marketing alliance.  
Hypothesis 9: A new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns upon the 
announcement of a marketing alliance increase as the new venture’s prior 
alliance experience increases.  
 
Technology Alliances and Alliance Experience. The ambiguity of technology alliances 
makes their benefits difficult to predict and the risks of failure are high (Park & Mezias, 
2005; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), so investor uncertainty about them can also be high 
(Das et al., 1998). Opportunism in technology alliances can be difficult to detect and 
prevent (Tyler & Steensma, 1998), and expropriated technology can be especially costly 
to new ventures (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). Moreover, the challenges associated with 
exchanging and developing technical knowledge, monitoring partners, and the possible 
need to protect proprietary technologies can tax the information processing capabilities 
of managers involved in these alliances (Tyler & Steensma, 1998). Given the challenges 
associated with technology alliances, the presence of alliance management knowledge 
and skills acquired through experience might be especially valuable. Thus, investors 
evaluating a firm engaged in a new technology alliance may look favorably on such 
experience.  
Beyond the difficult of managing technology alliances, experience may make 
managers better equipped to benefit from this activity. Prior alliance contacts can be a 
source of referrals, which may make a new venture firm a more attractive partner and 
may also enable the new venture to select better partners (Powell et al., 1996; Uzzi, 
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1997). Further, prior alliances are a source of absorptive capacity that increases the 
likelihood of learning in a subsequent alliance, perhaps increasing its chances of success 
(Simonin, 1997). Similarly, experience enhances competency with a set of activities 
(Levitt & March 1988), so prior alliance experience may make managers more able to 
leverage absorbed technical knowledge. Being well-embedded in a network of other 
alliances may also reduce a firm’s susceptibility to opportunism by providing external 
leveraging opportunities and reducing dependence on the focal alliance (Khanna et al., 
1998). Thus, both the value created by these alliances and the new venture’s ability to 
appropriate such value (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Dyer & Singh, 1998) may increase as 
the firm gains alliance experience. Given the uncertainty associated with technological 
activities in new ventures (Heeley et al., 2007), investors may respond positively to prior 
alliance experience.  
Hypothesis 10: A new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns upon the 
announcement of a technology alliance increase as the new venture’s prior 
alliance experience increases.  
 
Partner Complementarity 
Adler and Kwon (2002) argued that firms should use their external relationships 
to procure complementary resources, and there is evidence from a variety of contexts 
that complementarity is an important partner selection criterion (Chung et al., 2000; Hitt 
et al., 2000; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004), especially among high 
technology firms (Ahuja, 2000a; King & Hegarty 2003; Park & Kim, 1997). A 
motivation for seeking complementarity is that, through alliances, firms may be able to 
create unique and valuable resource combinations that single firms cannot create (Das & 
Teng, 2000). Thus, complementarity potentially increases the value of resources 
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(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). It may also provide opportunities to create synergies in the 
alliance (Luo, 2002a). Further, combining complementary resources in alliances can be a 
potent source of lasting competitive advantage because the resource combinations may 
be to a large extent inimitable, as they are built on the resources of autonomous firms 
and may become specific to the partnership over time (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Harrison et 
al., 2001). Accessing external resources may be necessary to build such combinations, 
particularly when internal resource endowments are weak or underdeveloped (Sirmon et 
al., 2007; Winter, 2000). In support, there is some evidence that complementary 
resources are positively related to alliance performance (Luo, 2002a). 
Marketing Alliances and Complementarity. There are many reasons why marketing 
alliances have the potential to generate significant value when they involve partners 
specialized in different market segments producing complementary products and 
services. Complementarity can result in supportive products and services that enhance 
the attractiveness of the firms’ offerings to customers (Srivastava et al., 1998). For 
instance, a biotechnology firm with a computer intensive product (e.g., Affymetrix has 
genetic arrays coded on microchips) may be able to benefit greatly from an alliance that 
markets this product with advanced hardware (e.g., from Intel or IBM). Similarly, 
because resource requirements are heterogeneous across industries (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993), alliances with firms from outside a new venture’s core market 
probably provide access to resources that are different from the firm’s own endowment, 
enlarging the pool of possible complementarities available (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 
1995).  
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Further, by partnering with firms in other markets, a new venture can enhance the 
customers exposed to its products, perhaps developing new applications that boost 
revenue opportunities. For instance, there is evidence from research on international 
market entries that forming alliances with partners that can provide market-related 
knowledge about the new country enhances the performance of small and medium sized 
enterprises entering those markets (Lu & Beamish, 2001). Similarly, Sivadas & Dwyer 
(2000) found evidence that partner complementarity enhanced the financial success of 
new products. In support of these arguments, Chan and colleagues (1997) found 
evidence that the partners as a whole create wealth when they form marketing alliances 
that span across industries.  
Hypothesis 11: A new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns upon 
the announcement of a marketing alliance are larger when there is 
complementarity between the new venture and its alliance partner. 
 
Technology Alliances and Complementarity, Rather than partnering in technology 
alliances because there is technological overlap, many firms attempt to partner with 
other firms that have interdependent or complementary technologies (Gulati, 1995; 
Mowery et al., 1998). Indeed, many have argued that accessing complementary 
resources may be necessary to leverage the full potential of innovative product and 
service offerings (Chang, 2003; Colombo et al., 2006; De Meyer, 1999). Firms 
competing primarily in different markets may have resources specialized to the 
respective markets (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Thus, firms forming technology 
alliances with partners from other markets have the potential to combine complementary 
knowledge resources to generate more novel innovations that appeal to a wider array of 
customers (Cantwell, 2001). Stated different, complementarity achieved by combining 
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resources specialized to different markets may allow the partnering firms to develop 
innovations that neither had the expertise to create alone, perhaps saving time and 
financial resources spent while enhancing quality (Harrigan, 1985; Sivadas & Dwyer, 
2000).  
Moreover, Mowery and his colleagues (1998) noted that accessing 
complementary resources from an alliance partner can help a firm improve other areas of 
its operations. It may be necessary to enter alliance arrangements to secure the needed 
complementarities from autonomous suppliers and other external stakeholders. In 
support, accessing a diversity of knowledge resources from alliance partners has been 
positively linked to firm growth in new ventures (Baum et al., 2000), but resource 
constraints make attempting to construct such complementarities without alliances 
especially difficult (Gulati, 1995). Thus, investors may perceive that technology 
alliances are especially promising when they involve cooperation among firms that 
typically serve different markets.  
Hypothesis 12: A new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns upon 
the announcement of a technology alliance are larger when there is 
complementarity between the new venture and its alliance partner. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data Sources 
 I identified the IPO firms using the Field-Ritter dataset, as used in Field and 
Karpof (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). This dataset contains identifying 
information and founding dates for 7,378 IPO firms over a 19 year period (1975-2003). 
Data for the independent and dependent variables came primarily from the Thompson 
Corporation’s Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database, the Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS) Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
database, CRSP Eventus software, and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) COMPUSTAT 
database. As in prior research on IPO-stage new ventures, data from these sources was 
supplemented with information from news retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis, 
company reports, and business publications (Certo et al., 2001; Pollock & Rindova, 
2003; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Sample 
Firms completing IPOs from the beginning of 1995 until the end of 2000 are the 
primary sampling frame for this study. This time frame was selected to focus on recent 
IPOs, while allowing adequate time for data on post-IPO alliance formation. Two 
thousand one hundred forty nine (2149) firms completed an IPO during this time period. 
After the market crash in 2000 and the subsequent economic downturn, only 221 firms 
completed IPOs in the next three years, representing a substantial reduction from the 
average number completing IPOs before that time. The alliance data were from those 
announced from the beginning of 2001 until the end of 2006. 
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High technology industries were selected because firms from such industries 
represent a large portion of IPOs during this time period, and this proportion grew 
substantially after the 1980s and early 1990s (Ritter & Welch, 2002). The industries 
selected were as follows: chemicals/biotechnology (SIC 2800s), computer equipment 
(3500s), general electronics (3600s), transportation manufacturing (3700s), measurement 
instruments/optics (3800s), telecommunications (4800s), business services/e-commerce 
(SIC 7300s), and engineering/advertising/research services (SIC 8700s).  
 In addition, consistent with a theoretical focus on new ventures, firms older than 
ten years of age at the time of IPO were excluded (Carpenter et al., 2003; Certo et al., 
2001). Finally, to be included in the sample, the firm had to have been involved in an 
announced marketing or technology alliance during the period 2001 to 2006. Using these 
criteria, the final sample contained 257 observations with complete data. 
Dependent Variable and Event Study Technique 
 Event study methodology was used to calculate the dependent variable. This 
methodology captures investor responses to announced but previously unanticipated 
events (MacKinlay, 1997). The announcement reflects new information for investors, 
and given at least a semi-efficient market (Fama, 1970), they adjust their trading based 
on this new information (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). To apply the 
methodology (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), one estimates the returns 
for a given firm, i, for a period of time, t, prior to the announced event (the estimation 
period) and regress this return on a market-wide index. The ordinary least squares 
regression equation, which is called the market model, is as follows:  
Rit = ά + β (Rmt) + έit 
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Rit is the return to firm i during time t. Rmt is the return on a market portfolio index 
during time t. έit is the error term. The parameter estimates, ά + β, vary from security to 
security. During the period surrounding the announcement in question (the event 
window), these parameter estimates are used to calculate the firm’s expected return, 
given the market’s return during that window. The difference between this expected 
return and the firm’s actual return during the window represents an “abnormal” return. 
Positive and negative deviations correspond to positive and negative investor reaction, 
respectively (Lee, 2001). These abnormal returns are standardized and summed over the 
event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
 The length of the estimation period must be long enough to generate reliable and 
unbiased estimates of the parameter estimates. Most strategic management studies on the 
market impact of alliance announcements have used estimation periods of at least 150 
days. However, trading volume and stock prices can fluctuate greatly following an IPO 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002), particularly for new venture firms (Carter, Dark, & Singh, 
1998). Thus, I use a longer period in an attempt to produce more stable estimates of the 
parameter estimates than would be probable with a shorter estimation period. To 
estimate the market model in the present study, I began 251 days prior to the event, 
which is approximately one year of trading days, and ended 10 days prior to the event 
(Park et al., 2004; Reuer & Koza, 2000). Terminating the estimation period 10 days prior 
to the event helps alleviate confounding between the event in question and the estimation 
of the market model.. Alliance announcements that occur within this 241 day period 
after IPO are excluded. 
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 Multiple indexes can be used to estimate the market model. Scholars typically 
use CRSP (Chan et al., 1997; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991) or S&P 500 indexes (Anand 
& Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002) to approximate the market return using data from 
CRSP. Scholars have also included value-weighted indices for the stock exchange on 
which the stock of the firm in question is traded (Das et al., 1998; Madhavan & Prescott, 
1995; Merchant & Schendel, 2000). This approach is used for the present study because 
the market returns used to calculate the parameter estimates vary across exchanges 
(Brown & Warner, 1980; Ritter, 1991). In particular, I use the CRSP Value Weighted 
Index to estimate the baseline market model. 
 Finally, I selected narrow event windows. Long event windows are problematic 
because they increase the likelihood that confounding events (e.g., dividends 
announcements, earnings announcements, etc.) occur during the period surrounding the 
announcement of interest (Bromiley et al., 1988; McWilliams & McGee, 1997). 
Introducing such extraneous variance into the analysis weakens the power of the test 
(Brown & Warner, 1980; MacKinlay, 1997). In strategic management research on 
market reactions to strategic alliances, variation in the length of the event window is 
considerable. For instance, some event windows can be as high as 20 days with smaller 
intervals analyzed within the larger window (Anand & Khanna, 2000). The most 
common windows used are two or three day periods. Including days before the 
announcement accounts for the possibility that information about the event in question 
may have been leaked prior to the announcement, whereas including days after the 
announcement accounts for less than instantaneous market reaction (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). In studies using multiple windows, statistically significant cumulative 
49 
 
abnormal returns are more likely to occur in the days immediately surrounding the 
announcement (Chan et al., 1997; Madhavan & Prescott, 1995; Reuer & Koza, 2000). 
To analyze the hypotheses, I use three event windows. The first one captures CARs on 
the day of the announcement only. The second is a three day window - the day of the 
announcement and the days immediately before and after it. The final window contains 
seven days, including the day of the announcement plus three days on either side of it. 
Identifying and Modeling Alliances and CARs 
SDC Joint Ventures/Alliances contains markers that identify alliance types. I 
coded marketing alliances as those identified as such in SDC, and I coded technology 
alliances as those identified as research and development, technology transfer, and/or 
technology alliances. Thus, the observations in the dataset are alliance announcements, 
and CARs are computed each time an alliance is announced. I used the CRSP Eventus 
software for this calculation. 
Independent Variables  
 Many alliances involve more than two firms. Additionally, whereas the new 
venture firms were independently traded public companies at the time of the 
announcement, many of the alliance partners were subsidiaries of diversified 
corporations. As such, although measuring the variables for the single new ventures was 
relatively straightforward, measuring the data from multiple alliance partners in the same 
alliance was more complex. Under the assumption that the immediate alliance partner, 
relative to a separate or perhaps holding company parent, is a more direct indicator of 
the accessed resources signaled through an alliance announcement, I collected data on 
the subsidiary when available. In a small minority of cases, only data from the parent 
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company were available. In these cases, I used the data from the parent. For the alliances 
involving multiple partners, I followed research indicating that aggregated resources 
across partners are relevant in signaling theory (Reuber & Fischer, 2003; Stuart et al., 
1999). Thus, for such alliances, I measured the variables by averaging the partners’ 
scores. 
Alliance partners’ commercial resources and alliance partners’ R&D resources 
are hypothesized to enhance the effects of marketing and technology alliance 
announcements, respectively, on cumulative abnormal returns (Hypotheses 1 and 2). The 
new venture’s commercial resources and the new venture’s R&D resources are also 
hypothesized to enhance the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the respective 
announcements (Hypotheses 5 and 6). For both new venture firms and their partners, 
commercial resources were measured in two ways. The first measure, advertising 
intensity, is the firm’s advertising expenses weighted by its total net sales (Lu & 
Beamish, 2001). The second measure is a count of new product announcements, as 
commercial prominence is reflected in the ability to introduce products to the market 
(Rothaermel, 2001). I collect this variable using Lexis-Nexis searches of business 
publications. Because data on the new ventures was less readily available, I 
supplemented these searches with information from company press releases, the online 
business press, and company reports. In general, the new products data on the new 
venture’s alliance partners came from Lexis-Nexis only. The measure is the cumulative 
number of announcements from 1996 until the alliance announcement, divided by the 
total number of years that the time period represents. Thus, this measure is new products 
per year. For both alliance partners, R&D resources are calculated as R&D intensity, 
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which is R&D expenses divided by net sales (Lu & Beamish, 2001). Data for both 
intensity measures was collected from COMPUSTAT. 
The size of a new venture’s alliance partner is hypothesized to increase the 
cumulative abnormal returns associated with marketing (Hypothesis 3) and technology 
(Hypothesis 4) alliance announcements. To measure this variable, I use partner total 
assets, which were collected from COMPUSTAT. 
The uncertainty associated with a new venture is hypothesized to increase the 
effect of marketing alliances (Hypothesis 7) and technology alliances (Hypothesis 8) on 
cumulative abnormal returns. Because smaller and younger new ventures have more 
uncertainty associated with them (Folta & Janney, 2004; Sanders & Boivie, 2004), I 
used the following two measures. The first is new venture size, which is measured as the 
new venture’s total assets. The second is new venture age, which is measured as the year 
of the alliance announcement less the year of the new venture’s founding. Data for the 
first measure comes from COMPUSTAT, and the founding year for the second comes 
from the Field-Ritter dataset. Because the hypotheses posit positive relationships 
between new venture uncertainty and CARs, negative regression coefficients are 
expected for these two variables. 
Finally, new venture alliance partner experience is hypothesized to increase the 
impact of marketing and technology alliances on cumulative abnormal returns 
(Hypotheses 9 and 10). This variable is measured as the count of the number of alliances 
in which a new venture had engaged from 2001 until the date of the alliance 
announcement (Sampson, 2007; Zollo et al., 2002). 
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Partner complementarity is hypothesized to enhance the effects of marketing and 
technology alliance announcements on a new venture’s cumulative abnormal returns 
(Hypotheses 11 and 12). As noted, complementarity is more likely when resources are 
different than when they are the similar. In prior alliance research, scholars have inferred 
complementarity when the partnering firms compete in different segments or industries 
(Calabrese et al., 2000; Chung et al., 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). In this spirit, using 
information from COMPUSTAT, complementarity is a dummy variable identifying 
whether or not the alliance partners have different 3-digit SIC codes. Assessing 
complementarity at the 3-digit level was selected to provide a more fine grained measure 
than a 2-digit measure provides. 
Control Variables 
Control variables were included in the analysis to capture the effects of other 
variables thought to influence IPO performance.  
 First, I included controls for the IPO firm’s ownership structure. There is 
evidence that shares held by institutional investors are important in IPO-stage new 
ventures, perhaps because such holdings signal that a firm is well-governed and perhaps 
confident in its future earning potential (Aggarwal et al., 2002). Such holdings also 
affect investments, such as R&D, as well as trading volume and stock price fluctuation 
in post-IPO firms (Bushee, 1998). This measure, external ownership, was calculated as 
the percentage of the firm’s outstanding stock owned by institutional investors. The new 
ventures’ proxy statements include data on beneficial owners of more than 5.0 % of 
outstanding stock, and the percentage held by such owners was used to calculate this 
measure. In a small minority of cases, data on this variable were not available for a given 
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year but were available for the prior year. In these cases, I selected the data for the prior 
year. Data beyond one year prior were excluded. 
 Other research indicates that ownership by TMT members and directors can also 
reduce investor uncertainty regarding agency hazards stemming from inadequate 
incentive structures (Certo et al., 2003; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Generally, this 
work suggests that investors value equity compensation plans that align manager and 
board member incentives with those of shareholders. Conceptually, the TMT and board 
members are the groups of individuals, including the CEO, who comprise a firm’s 
dominant coalition (Cyert & March, 1963; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). The new 
ventures’ proxy statements include data on the percentage of outstanding stock held by 
officers and directors, and this percentage was used to measure executive ownership. For 
this variable, the same observations had current year data, but lacked prior year data, as 
occurred in measuring outside ownership. Thus, I included the prior year data in these 
cases, but data beyond one year in the past were excluded. 
 Also, in analyzing the marketing alliances, controls were inserted for the 
partners’ R&D resources. In analyzing the technology alliances, I controlled for the 
partners’ commercial resources. In the marketing alliance subsample, the focus was 
commercial resources, so I included new venture and partner R&D resources to partial 
out any effect they may have on the CARs associated with marketing alliances. In the 
technology alliance subsample, the focus was R&D resources. Thus, I included 
commercial resource controls in the technology alliance analysis to partial out their 
effects from the effects associated with R&D resources. 
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Finally, as in other IPO studies using samples that span multiple time periods, a 
series of year dummy variables are included to capture time-varying effects (Carpenter 
et al., 2003; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). The omitted variable is for 2006. Because 
multiple industries are included, I also incorporated a dummy variable identifying the 
new venture’s industry (Certo et al., 2001; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). The omitted 
variable is for engineering/advertising/research services (8700s). 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Statistical Analysis 
 The sample of alliances was divided into marketing and technology alliance 
subsamples to evaluate the hypotheses. The odd numbered hypotheses (Hypotheses 1, 3, 
5, 7, 9, and 11) pertain to marketing alliances, and the even numbered hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12) pertain to technology alliances. Given the dependent 
variable, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used. Because the partnering firms 
may be represented more than once in a given year but are not necessarily represented in 
every year, the dependent variable was modeled using STATA’s cluster option and 
robust standard errors to account for non-independent error terms. In each test, the 
control variables were entered first, followed by the hypothesized independent variables 
of interest. The final sample consists of 132 observations and 125 observations for the 
marketing and technology alliance subsamples, respectively, for which complete data 
were available. 
Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
Before analyzing the hypotheses, I evaluated the extent to which the data 
conformed to key assumptions of multiple regression. In particular, I examined 
normality and outliers, homoskedasticity, and multicollinearity separately for each 
subsample and for each dependent variable. First, I evaluated normality and checked for 
outliers. Because many of the variables are measured on vastly different scales (e.g., the 
intensity variables versus total assets), the continuous controls and independent variables 
were standardized. After standardizing the variables, I analyzed the skewness statistics 
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and the histograms, finding that all of these variables were skewed, many of them 
severely so. To address this problem, I took the natural logarithm of these variables. 
After such transformations, this group of variables better approximated normality. 
Additionally, I used the leverage statistic (i.e., Stata’s hat statistic) to check for outliers. 
Leverage statistics exceeding 0.5 indicate especially drastic outliers (Hamilton, 1992). 
None of my observations exceeded this criterion in any of the models. Thus, outliers do 
not appear to be a serious problem. 
Second, using the transformed variables, I plotted the residuals and predicted y-
values (i.e., y-hat) for all of the marketing and technology alliance hypothesized models 
(one day, three day, and seven day CARs for each of the two subsamples; six models in 
total). In general, the graphs indicated that the regressions produced a set of models that 
approximate homoskedasticity. 
Third, I examined multicollinearity using both the bivariate correlation matrices, 
provided in Tables 1 and 2, and the variance inflation factors (VIF). For the marketing 
subsample bivariate correlations, I analyzed the (non-industry or -year dummy) control 
variables and independent variables, finding that the highest correlation was 0.59 (shared 
variance is approximately 0.35). This correlation was the only one over 0.50. Less than 
4.0% of the correlations were greater than 0.40. Thus, analysis of the bivariate 
correlations suggests no serious multicollinearity violations. In analyzing multivariate 
multicollinearity using the VIF scores, the only two variables exceeding 10, which 
Neter, Wasserman, and Kutners (1989) caution is a sign of multicollinearity problems, 
were the industry dummy variables denoting chemicals/biotechnology firms (12.28) and 
business services/e-commerce firms (20.32). These scores represent tolerance values of 
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0.08 and 0.05, respectively, indicating that respectively about 92% and 95% of the 
variance in these two variables is shared with the other independent and control 
variables. Of the remaining non-industry and year dummies, only four variables have 
VIFs above the more stringent criterion of 2 set forth by Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, and West 
(2003), and the highest score was 2.55 (new venture total assets), indicating 61% shared 
variance. Moreover, every one of the industry and year dummies exceeded 2, and the 
highest score below 10 was 9.58, indicating 90% shared variance. 
In the technology subsample, excluding the industry and year control variables, 
the highest bivariate correlation for was 0.53 (i.e., shared variance is approximately 
0.28). Less than 6.5% of these correlations exceeded 0.40. In analyzing multivariate 
multicollinearity for the non-industry and year dummies, none had scores exceeding 10, 
only four exceeded 2, and the highest was 5.41 (new venture total assets), indicating 
82% shared variance. Further, although none of the industry and year dummies had 
scores above 10, only three (computer equipment, telecommunications, and the year 
2003) did not exceed 2, and the highest score among these variables was 5.14 
(chemicals/biotechnology), indicating 81% shared variance.  
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Table 1
Marketing Alliances
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Variable
ab
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. 1-Day value weighted CARsc 0.04 0.13
2. 3-Day value weighted CARsc 0.06 0.17 0.87
3. 7-Day value weighted CARsc 0.06 0.18 0.76 0.87
4. New venture executive ownership 0.71 0.39 0.16 0.10 0.04
5. New venture external ownership 0.81 0.39 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.18
6. New venture advertising intensity 0.30 0.45 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.12
7. New venture R&D intensity 0.18 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.15 -0.22
8. New venture total assets 0.33 0.43 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.19 -0.24 0.47 -0.24
9. New venture age 1.13 0.31 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.16 0.06 -0.33 0.05 0.12
10. New venture alliance experience 0.43 0.44 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.18 -0.21 0.20 -0.27 0.59 0.15
11. New venture new products per year 0.33 0.41 -0.09 -0.01 0.06 -0.09 -0.09 0.24 -0.23 0.42 0.00 0.38
12. Partner advertising intensity 0.33 0.45 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.14 -0.09 0.18 -0.10 0.11 0.18
13. Partner R&D intensity 0.05 0.25 -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 0.34 -0.06 0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12
14. Partner total assets 0.24 0.38 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.20 -0.09 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10
15. Partner new products per year 0.26 0.40 0.09 0.22 0.11 -0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.03 -0.10 0.35
16. Complementarity 0.56 0.50 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.15 -0.03 0.18 -0.15
a. N = 132. 
b. Correlations of absolute value greater than .14 are statistically significant at p  < .10, those greater than .17 are significant at p  < .05,
    and those greater than .22 are significant at p < .01.
c. Dependent variable.  
Table 2
Technology Alliances
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Variable
ab
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. 1-Day value weighted CARsc 0.03 0.12
2. 3-Day value weighted CARsc 0.05 0.15 0.88
3. 7-Day value weighted CARsc 0.04 0.17 0.78 0.82
4. New venture executive ownership 0.14 0.27 0.06 0.07 -0.14
5. New venture external ownership 0.92 0.39 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 0.03
6. New venture advertising intensity 0.11 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.08
7. New venture R&D intensity 0.21 0.33 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.15
8. New venture total assets 0.19 0.37 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.14 0.09 0.03 -0.20
9. New venture age 1.17 0.33 -0.20 -0.25 -0.14 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.08 0.17
10. New venture alliance experience 0.46 0.43 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.13 0.18 -0.04 -0.25 0.43 0.21
11. New venture new products per year 0.30 0.40 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 -0.03 -0.36 0.46 0.22 0.48
12. Partner advertising intensity 0.28 0.46 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.18 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.02
13. Partner R&D intensity 0.09 0.33 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.34 0.39 -0.05 -0.03 -0.11 -0.16 -0.15
14. Partner total assets 0.33 0.42 0.16 0.10 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.16 0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.10 0.38 -0.19
15. Partner new products per year 0.28 0.39 0.19 0.27 0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.12 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.35 -0.17 0.53
16. Complementarity 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.02 0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.18 -0.26 0.13 -0.12 0.12 0.07 0.16 -0.10 0.23 0.02
a. N = 125. 
b. Correlations of absolute value greater than .147 are statistically significant at p  < .10, those greater than .17 are significant at p  < .05, 
    and those greater than .22 are significant at p < .01.
c. Dependent variable.  
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These results suggest that, aside from the set of industry and year dummy 
variables, extreme multicollinearity does not appear to be a serious concern for the 
independent and control variables in either the marketing or the technology subsamples. 
In sum, the data and models approximate key assumptions of multiple regression. 
Heteroskedasticity, outliers, and multicollinearity are not serious concerns.  
For ease of presentation, I present the results for the marketing and technology 
alliances separately. Marketing alliance results are presented first, followed by the 
technology alliance results. In addition, the results for the industry and year dummy 
variables, though included in Tables 3 (table on page 61) and 4 (table on page 66), are 
not discussed below. 
Marketing Alliance Results  
Analysis of the mean abnormal returns for the marketing alliance subsample 
reveals that the cumulative abnormal returns associated with marketing alliance 
announcements during the one day, three day, and seven day event windows were 
4.23%, 5.71%, and 5.71%, respectively, and all three of these values were statistically 
significant at p < .001 (respectively, generalized sign z = 3.598; 3.598; 3.424). In 
addition, the abnormal returns on the day before the announcement were 1.49%, which 
was also statistically significant (generalized sign z = 3.075; p < .01). Three days before 
the announcement, the abnormal returns were .88%. This value was marginally 
statistically significant (generalized sign z = 1.855; p < .10). Interestingly, however, the 
abnormal returns for the new ventures three days after the announcement were -0.78%, 
which was statistically significant (generalized sign z = -2.155; p < .05). None of the 
other days in the focal event windows had statistically significant abnormal returns. 
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Therefore, there is some evidence of information leakage in the days preceding an 
announcement, and there is also some evidence of declining investor sentiment after the 
initial increase occurring upon a marketing alliance announcement. Further, consistent 
with the earlier argument that the abnormal returns associated with an announcement are 
often concentrated in a short event window, the absolute value of the abnormal returns 
on the announcement date were higher than the corresponding value for any other days 
in the focal event windows.  
Regarding the hypothesized models, none of the sampled new venture firms from 
the transportation manufacturing industry formed one of these alliances during the 
period under investigation. Thus, the dummy variable for this industry was excluded by 
necessity from this analysis. In the control variable only models (Models 1, 3, and 5 in 
Table 3), the only control variable outside of year and industry dummies that was 
statistically significant was new venture R&D intensity. In the three day model, the 
variable’s regression coefficient was positive and statistically significant (b = 0.08; p < 
.01), and it was positive and marginally statistically significant in the seven day model (b 
= 0.05; p < .10). 
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For the one, three, and seven day models, the control variables explained 
approximately 10%, 9%, and 6% of the total variance in new venture CARs, 
respectively. Addition of the primary independent variables explained roughly 10%, 
10%, and 6% more, respectively. In the full models (Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table 3), the 
executive ownership variable is marginally statistically significant for one day CARs (b 
= 0.06; p < .10). New venture R&D intensity is positive and statistically significant for 
three day CARs (b = 0.05; p < .05) and is positive and marginally statistically significant 
for the seven day CARs (b = 0.03; p < .10). Finally, partner R&D intensity is negative 
and marginally statistically significant for the 3 day CARs (b = -0.05; p < .10). 
Hypothesis 1 states that the commercial resources of a new venture’s alliance 
partner are positively related to the new venture CARs associated with the 
announcement of a marketing alliance with that partner. Commercial resources are 
operationalized using the advertising intensity measure and new products per year. For 
the advertising intensity measure, none of the regression coefficients are statistically 
significant. The regression coefficients are -0.02, -0.02, and approximately 0.00 for the 
one day, three day, and seven days CARs, respectively. However, using the new 
products per year measure, this hypothesis received support. In particular, for the one 
day, three day, and seven day CARs models, the regression coefficients were 0.04 (p < 
.10), 0.10 (p < .05), and 0.06 (p < .05), respectively. Thus, Hypothesis 1 did not receive 
support using the advertising intensity measure, but the hypothesis did receive support 
using the new products per year measure.  
 Hypothesis 3 states that the size of the new venture’s alliance partner is 
positively related to the new venture CARs associated with the announcement of a 
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marketing alliance with that partner. Partner firm size is operationalized as total assets. 
For the one day, three day, and seven day models, the regression coefficients were 0.05, 
0.05, and 0.04, respectively; none of these coefficients were statistically significant.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 does not receive support.  
 Hypothesis 5 states that the new venture’s commercial resources are positively 
related to the new venture CARs associated with the announcement of a marketing 
alliance. This variable is operationalized using the new venture’s advertising intensity 
and new products per year. For the former measure, none of the three regression 
coefficients (b = 0.03; b = 0.02; b = 0.02 for one day, three day, and seven day CARs, 
respectively) are statistically significant. The latter measure, though not statistically 
significant in the one day or three day models (b ~ 0.00; b = 0.03), is positive and 
marginally statistically significant in the seven day model (b = .05; p < .10). Thus, across 
all six regressions coefficients, there is little support for Hypothesis 5.  
 Hypothesis 7 states that the uncertainty associated with a new venture is 
positively related to the new venture CARs associated with the announcement of a 
marketing alliance. I operationalized uncertainty using new venture age and total assets. 
Younger and smaller new ventures are presumed to have more uncertainty associated 
with them. Respectively, the coefficients for these variables were -0.10 (p < .10) and -
0.06 (n.s.) in the one day model, -0.08 (n.s.) and -0.07 (n.s.) in the three day model, and -
0.10 (n.s.) and -0.08 (n.s.) in the seven day model. Thus, of the six regression 
coefficients used to test this hypothesis, only one was marginally statistically significant. 
Thus, there is little support for Hypothesis 7. 
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 Hypothesis 9 predicts that a new venture’s alliance experience is positively 
related to the new venture CARs associated with the announcement of a marketing 
alliance. As noted, this variable was operationalized as a count of the new venture’s 
previous alliances. For the one day, three day, and seven day models, none of the 
regression coefficients (b = 0.01; b = 0.01; b = 0.01, respectively) for this variable were 
statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 9 received no supported. 
Hypothesis 11 predicts that the presence of complementarity among the partners 
is positively related to the new venture CARs associated with a marketing alliance 
announcement. This variable was operationalized as a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the partners are in different 3-digit SIC industries. For the one day, three 
day, and seven day models, none of the regression coefficients (b = -0.01; b = 0.01; b = 
0.01, respectively) for this variable were statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 11 
does not receive support. 
Technology Alliance Results 
The mean cumulative abnormal returns associated with a technology alliance 
announcement for the one day, three day, and seven day event windows were 3.48%, 
4.62%, and 4.49%, respectively, and all three values were statistically significant at p < 
.01 (respectively, generalized sign z = 3.026; 3.026; 2.668). Additionally, the mean 
abnormal returns for the announcement date and the day after were 3.48% and 0.62%, 
respectively, and both were statistically significant (respectively, generalized sign z = 
3.026; p < .01 and 2.131; p < .05). None of the other days in the focal event windows 
had statistically significant abnormal returns. These results suggest investors tend to  
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react positively on the announcement date, but do not always react instantaneously to 
new venture technology alliance announcements. However, as with marketing alliances, 
the highest absolute value of abnormal returns occurs on the announcement date. 
In the technology alliance models, the transportation manufacturing industry 
(SIC 3700s) dummy variable had variance and was included. In the control variable only 
model for one day CARs, new venture new products per year was negative and 
statistically significant (b = -0.11; p < .05). In the control only model for three day CARs 
(Models 1, 3, and 5 in Table 4), new venture advertising intensity was positive and 
statistically significant (b = 0.04; p < .05). Finally, in the seven day CARs model, new 
venture executive ownership was negative and statistically significant (b = -0.09; p < 
.05) and partner advertising intensity was also negative and statistically significant (b = -
0.08; p < .05). The control only models contained no other statistically significant 
regression coefficients.  For the one day, three day, and seven day CARs models, the 
control variables explained roughly 28%, 22%, and 26% of the variance in the dependent 
variable. 
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In the full models, outside of year and industry dummies, none of the control 
variables were statistically significant for one day CARs, new venture advertising 
intensity (b = 0.06; p < .05) was positive and statistically significant for three day CARs, 
and partner advertising intensity was negative and statistically significant (b = -0.08; p < 
.05) for seven day CARs. None of the other control variables were statistically 
significant in any of the full models. For the one day, three day, and seven day models, 
addition of the hypothesized independent variables explained approximately 10%, 7%, 
and 5% additional variance in the dependent variables, respectively. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the R&D resources of a new venture’s partner are 
positively related to the new venture CARs associated with a technology alliance 
announcement. This variable is operationalized as R&D intensity. The regression 
coefficients for the one day, three day, and seven day CARs models were -0.01, -0.03, 
and -0.03, respectively, and none of these coefficients were statistically significant. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that the size of a new venture’s partner is positively related 
to the new venture CARs associated with a technology alliance announcement. This 
variable is operationalized using total assets. The regression coefficients for the one day, 
three day, and seven day CARs models (b = 0.02; b = -0.02; b = -0.04) were not 
statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 6 states that a new venture’s R&D resources are positively related to 
its CARs upon a technology alliance announcement. This variable is operationalized as 
R&D intensity. The regression coefficients for the one day, three day, and seven day 
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CARs models (b = -0.02; b ~ 0.0; b = -0.02) were not statistically significant. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 8 states that the uncertainty associated with a new venture is 
positively related to its CARs upon the announcement of a technology alliance. This 
variable is operationalized using the new venture’s age and total assets (i.e., size). The 
regression coefficients for new venture age were -0.08, -0.12, and -0.07 in the one day, 
three day, and seven day CARs models, and none were statistically significant. For new 
venture size, the regression coefficient was negative and statistically significant in the 
one day model (b = -0.16; p < .05), but neither regression coefficient was statistically 
significant in either the three day or the seven day models (b = -0.15; b = -0.19, 
respectively). Thus, of the six coefficients used to test this hypothesis, only one 
supported Hypothesis 8. As such, it received little support. 
 Hypothesis 10 predicts that the CARs associated with a technology alliance 
announcement are higher as the new venture’s alliance experience increases. Again, this 
variable was operationalized as the sum of the new venture’s prior alliances, as reported 
above. In the one day, three day, and seven day CARs models, none of the regression 
coefficients (b = .06; b = .05; b = .03, respectively) were statistically significant. Thus, 
Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  
Lastly, Hypothesis 12 indicates that the CARs associated with a technology 
alliance announcement are higher when there is complementarity between the partners. 
This variable is operationalized as a dummy variable indicating whether or not the 
partners are in different 3-digit SIC industries. The regression coefficients for the one 
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day, three day, and seven day models were -0.03, -0.01, and 0.02, none of which were 
statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 12 is not supported. 
Results by Event Window 
 
 Strategic management scholars using event study methodology for research on 
strategic alliances use various event windows. To provide additional insight, scholars 
sometimes use multiple windows within a single study (e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Das et al., 1998). This section contains interpretation and additional comments on this 
study’s results by event window. 
 For the first event window, one-day value (day 0) weighted CARs is the 
dependent variable. Narrow event windows can improve power by reducing the 
likelihood of extraneous confounding events (Brown & Warner, 1980; MacKinlay, 
1997). However, if market reaction to all of the information in announcements is not 
always instantaneous, extremely short windows can miss some of the changes in trading 
behavior and returns that are of interest (e.g., Fama et al., 1969; Fama, 1970). In the full 
model using one-day CARs in the marketing subsample (Model 2), the control variable 
executive ownership (positive; p < .10), the new venture age variable (negative; p < 
.10), and the partner new products variable (positive; p < .10) approach statistical 
significance. Outside of the industry and year dummies, no other variables did so. In the 
corresponding model (Model 2) in the technology subsample, except for the industry and 
year variables, only new venture total assets (negative; p < .05) was statistically 
significant. Of the five hypotheses pertaining to marketing alliances, using this window 
only, there was limited support for Hypotheses 1 and 7. In the technology subsample, 
there was limited support for one (Hypothesis 8) of the five hypotheses pertaining to 
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technology alliances. Stated differently, in marketing alliances, there was marginal 
support for the commercial resources and new venture uncertainty hypotheses for one of 
the two indicators used to operationalize each construct. In technology alliances, there 
was partial support for the new venture uncertainty hypothesis at conventional 
significance levels. Consistent with the idea that shorter windows increase power, these 
models explained the most variance in CARs in both subsamples. However, outside of 
the industry and year controls, the models using this event window contained the same 
number of statistically significant or marginally statistically significant effects as the 
models used with the other two event windows. In the marketing subsample, there were 
three such effects per window and in the technology subsample, there was one such 
effect per window. 
 A three-day window allows for information leaks that occur before the 
announcement and for less than instantaneous market reaction after the announcements 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Studying the days immediately surrounding the 
announcement date is common in research in this area (e.g., Das et al., 1998; Park & 
Mezias, 2005; Reuer & Koza, 2000). In the present study, for the full model (Model 4) 
in the marketing subsample using three-day (days -1, 0, and 1) value weighted CARs, 
the control variable new venture R&D intensity (positive; p < .05) is statistically 
significant and the control variable partner R&D intensity (negative; p < .10) is 
marginally statistically significant. Outside of the industry and year controls, the only 
other variable that is statistically significant is the partner new products variable 
(positive; p < .05). In the corresponding model (Model 4) for the technology subsample, 
except for the industry and year dummies, the only variable that is statistically 
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significant is new venture advertising intensity (positive; p < 05). Thus, in the marketing 
alliances, there was partial support for the commercial resources hypothesis (Hypothesis 
1) using one of the indicators for that construct. Tentatively, the marginal negative effect 
of partner R&D intensity in the marketing subsample may indicate that investors 
discount complementarity when an R&D intensive partner firm contributes the resources 
that complement the alliance activities. Though not hypothesized, the new venture R&D 
intensity control variable is positively related to three-day CARs in the marketing 
subsample and the new venture advertising intensity control variable is positively related 
to the dependent variable in the technology subsample. These results offer tentative 
evidence that investors value complementarity in a new venture’s marketing and 
technology alliances (as discussed more fully in Chapter VI below), especially when the 
new venture has the resources that complement the alliance activities. Finally, although 
the length of the event window suggests that these models might have the second most 
explained variance, the models explain the second most variance and the third most 
variance in the marketing and technology subsamples, respectively.   
 As noted, strategic management scholars using a seven-day window increase the 
likelihood of tracking the trading behavior and stock price movements that are of 
interest, but may also increase the likelihood that confounding events distort the results 
or weaken power (Bromiley et al., 1989; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In the present 
study, for the full model (Model 6) using seven-day (days -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, and 3) CARs 
as the dependent variable in the marketing subsample, the control variable new venture 
R&D intensity is marginally statistically significant (positive; p < .10). Other than the 
industry and year controls, the only other variables approaching statistical significance 
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are the new venture new products per year measure (positive; p < .10) and the partner 
new products per year measure (positive; p < .05). In the corresponding model for the 
technology subsample, the relationship between partner advertising intensity negative; p 
< .05) and CARs was the only statistically significant effect for variables other than 
those controlling for industry and year. As such, in the marketing alliances, there was 
marginal support for one indicator of new venture commercial resources and there was 
full support for one indicator of partner commercial resources, providing limited support 
for Hypothesis 5 and partial support for Hypothesis 1, respectively. In the technology 
alliances, none of the five hypotheses was supported, but the negative relationship 
between partner advertising intensity and CARs in the seven day model loosely parallels 
the negative relationship between partner R&D intensity and CARs in the three-day 
marketing alliances results. Together, these two results are tentative evidence that some 
investors may discount complementarity when the partner firm has the resources that 
complement the alliance activities. Lastly, in contrast to the expectation that they would 
explain the least variance in the dependent variable, the models explain the least 
variance and the second most variance in the marketing and technology subsamples, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation, I integrated signaling theory with resource-based theory on 
strategic alliances to ascertain the signals associated with the resources that new ventures 
potentially access through their alliances. Investor responses to alliance announcements 
were used to test the theoretical arguments proposed. The theoretical logic was based on 
the argument that new ventures send multiple signals in the months and years 
surrounding an IPO, and investors likely use multiple signals to ascertain the 
performance prospects of such firms (Ang & Brau, 2003; Folta & Janney, 2004; Pollock 
et al., 2008). In general, signaling theory suggests that signals must be observable, the 
qualities of interest must be inversely proportional to the costs of sending the signal, and 
the signal must be similarly inimitable by lower quality entities (Certo, 2003; Spence, 
1973). From this perspective, the presence of multiple signals communicating consistent 
information enhances interpretation, as they allow receivers to cross validate the 
information they contain (Heil & Robertson, 1991).  
From a resource-based perspective, a key purpose of strategic alliances is to gain 
access to the resources of other firms (Hitt et al., 2000; Ireland et al., 2002). For new 
ventures that otherwise have limited resources, forming strategic alliances with firms 
that have the needed resources can be especially valuable (Powell et al., 1996; Stuart et 
al., 1999). Despite the importance of strategic alliances as way for new ventures to 
access resources, these firms are also vulnerable to some of the challenges associated 
with strategic alliances, such as the complexity of managing them to achieve their 
benefits (Khanna et al., 1998), partner opportunism (Hamel, 1991), and overdependence 
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on partners (Miner et al., 1990). Thus, new ventures may need to approach their 
alliances with caution, particularly with respect to the partners with whom they form 
such alliances.  
Drawing on this base, a central argument in this dissertation is that the resources 
potentially accessed through strategic alliances may be important signals to investors 
evaluating a new venture’s performance prospects. In general, scholars have separated 
alliances into broad categories representing marketing alliances that perform 
downstream value chain activities and technology alliances that perform upstream 
activities (Das et al., 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993; Park & Mezias, 2005). This line of 
research suggests that these alliances make different resources available to the 
participating firms. The former enhances access to customers, distribution channels, new 
markets, and so on. The latter provides access to resources, such as technical knowledge, 
engineering skills, new technologies, and so on. Because these alliances are relatively 
well-defined in the literature with respect to the resources that can be accessed and 
because such access may serve as signals to investors evaluating a participating firm, I 
used this dichotomy to frame my theory and empirical analysis.  
In general, however, my hypotheses received limited support. In the following 
section, I discuss the hypotheses individually, attempting to explain the implications of 
the findings theoretically and methodologically. For all of the hypotheses, I discuss the 
theoretical and methodological limitations of my approach, and offer research 
suggestions for future work in this area.  
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Implications, Limitations, and Future Research Suggestions 
Hypothesis 1 was generally supported across all three dependent variables (one 
day, three day, and seven day) for the new products per year measure but was not 
supported in any of the models for the advertising intensity measure. The theoretical 
logic underlying this hypothesis was that marketing alliances provide access to resources 
targeted toward the commercialization of product and service offerings. From the 
perspective that consistency enhances signal quality, I predicted that investors would 
respond favorably to alliance announcements when the new venture’s partner possesses 
strong commercial resources. Support for this hypothesis with the new products 
introduction measure, but not with the advertising intensity measure, may reflect that the 
former is a stronger indicator of the ability to commercialize products than is the latter.  
Moreover, many partners are high technology firms that serve other business 
customers and rely little on advertising. Indeed, in this context, the ability to repeatedly 
introduce well-received new products may also obviate the need for advertising to some 
extent. Thus, though these firms may have strong commercial resources, this strength 
may not be reflected in advertising expenditures. In this sense, although the advertising 
and new products measures were intended to capture the same construct, commercial 
resources, perhaps they are capturing different phenomena. Future research on the 
construct validity of these and similar measures might improve our understanding of 
them. For example, in the marketing subsample, the correlation between these two 
measures is .03. As such, an interesting question is whether they are capturing different 
constructs or different aspects of the same construct. In addition to commercial 
resources, for instance, advertising may reflect efforts to manage a firm’s image with the 
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media and investors, and new product introductions may reflect multiple aspects of 
innovativeness. Finally, industries vary widely in the number of new products 
participants introduce per year. For instance, it may take decades to develop and market 
a new drug, but software improvements may happen multiple times in a year. Therefore, 
a measure that captures new product introductions relative to industry averages might be 
a more robust indicator than that included in the present study. 
Similarly, Hypothesis 2 was formulated on the premise that forming a technology 
alliance with a partner with strong R&D resources would be a consistent signal that 
would be attractive to investors. The percentage of net sales spent on R&D (R&D 
intensity) was used to evaluate this hypothesis, but it was not supported in any of the 
models. One explanation may be that significant R&D expenditures by an alliance 
partner may give it a bargaining power advantage in the alliance based on its ability to 
contribute these resources to or withhold them from the focal alliance. This advantage 
might allow partners to appropriate much of the value the alliance creates. It might also 
underlie a partner’s ability to opportunistically expropriate a new venture’s technology 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Hamel, 1991). Investors concerned about such possibilities 
may react negatively, perhaps producing a null effect by negating the positive signals 
associated with technology alliance formation with an R&D intensive firm. Whether and 
how investors perceive inter-partner dynamics and whether and how such information 
affects investor evaluation are interesting questions for future research to address.  
In addition, though R&D intensity may indicate the quantity of resources a firm 
invests in R&D, the measure may be inadequate for representing the quality of the 
innovative resources that partner can bring to a technology alliance. How and to what 
77 
 
extent partner R&D spending contributes to the success of a technology alliance are 
interesting questions. Using partner perceptions of alliance performance as the 
dependent variable may be a way to address this question (e.g., Li & Atuahene-Gima, 
2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Robins, Tallman, & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). Similarly, 
how and to what extent does each partner’s R&D spending influences firm-level 
performance outcomes? In addition to perceptions, objective indicators (e.g., firm 
market returns, survival, growth, etc.) could be used to address the second questions 
(e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Kale et al., 2002; Miner et al., 1990).  
Hypothesis 3 predicted a positive relationship between a partner’s size and the 
CARs associated with a marketing alliance announcement. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 
predicted that the relationship would hold in technology alliance announcements as well. 
The foundation for these hypotheses was that signals emanating from leading 
organizations may be more credible, as these organizations are thought to be better 
evaluators, to avoid associating with inferior firms, and to have more partnering options 
at their disposal (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004; Stuart, 1998). For marketing alliances, the 
positive effects of allying with a large partner were also expected to be strengthened by 
the potential for the new venture to tap into a large partner’s revenue stream and 
customer base. In technology alliances, the visibility, reputation, and legitimacy of a 
large alliance partner was expected to alleviate some of the information asymmetry 
associated with technological activity. However, neither hypothesis was supported in 
any of the models.  
Perhaps the size of an alliance partner is an inadequate proxy for the extent to 
which a partner’s endorsement would be valued because of the prestige associated with 
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that partner. Indeed, the size of a firm may not fully reflect the extent to which it is a 
leading firm, as many large firms are not industry leaders. The measure may also reflect 
inter-industry differences. Moreover, the benefits of increasingly large size are limited, 
and it may indeed be a liability in some cases (Hitt et al., 1997; Lu & Beamish, 2004). 
Thus, future research should adopt a more fine-grained approach to identifying the 
characteristics of partners that make their endorsements valuable to investors (e.g., 
Stuart et al., 1999). For instance, a more precise measure of the endorsement value of 
leading firms would involve gauging the perceptions of investors about the prestige 
associated with those firms (Certo, 2003). In addition, measuring how well past alliance 
partners performed during and after their alliances with a focal firm could indicate its 
partner selection capabilities, thereby providing indirect information on the value of its 
endorsement. 
Hypothesis 5 suggested that a new venture’s commercial resources would be 
positively related to the CARs generated upon a marketing alliance announcement. The 
logic was similar to that offered above in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, in that 
possessing strong commercial resources and forming a marketing alliance enhances 
signal consistency. Again, the hypothesis was not supported for the advertising intensity 
variable and received limited support with the new venture new products per year 
measure. Although the correlation (r = 0.35) between the two measures was higher in the 
technology subsample than in the marketing subsample, considerable unshared variance 
remains, raising questions about the constructs underlying the measures.  
Further, the shortcomings of the advertising intensity measure are again relevant, 
but the new products measure suffers limitations as well. First, it is operationalized as 
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the number of new products introduced per year from 1996 until the alliance 
announcement. Thus, for some observations, it contained new product introductions over 
a ten year period. Perhaps investors are concerned with recent history when evaluating 
commercial resources. Constructing the measure in tighter windows (e.g., one to five 
years prior to the announcement) might address this issue. Moreover, because adequate 
data on the new ventures was not always available from Lexis-Nexis, I supplemented 
these data liberally with press releases, annual reports, and the online business press. 
This approach may have introduced additional error into the measure because firms issue 
and document their press releases differently and also differ in how openly they discuss 
new products in annual reports. Also, articles published online may be unevenly 
accessible and are accessible for varying lengths of time. These measurement errors may 
explain why the results for the partner new products measure, which had more consistent 
collection procedures due to data availability, produced stronger results. Having 
additional people code new product introductions and establishing inter-rater reliability 
would also help address some of these concerns. 
For Hypothesis 6, I predicted that a new venture’s R&D resources would be 
positively related to the CARs associated with its announcement of a technology 
alliance. Again, my logic relied primarily on the benefits of signal consistency. 
However, this hypothesis was not supported in any of the models. Beyond the potential 
weaknesses of this measure discussed above, the results of this variable as a control in 
the marketing alliance subsample points to an interesting possibility. In the marketing 
alliance subsample, this variable is positive and at least marginally statistically 
significant in two of the three CARs windows. Perhaps these results suggest that 
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investors value complementarity, in addition to consistency, in a new venture’s alliance 
activities, especially when the new venture is the one with resources that complement 
the alliance activities. 
Indeed, in the marketing subsample, the R&D intensity (R&D per dollar of sales) 
of the new ventures was over three times higher than that of their partners; in the 
technology subsample, new venture R&D intensity was over twice that of partner R&D 
intensity. In knowledge intensive high technology industries such as those studied 
herein, the structures and incentive schemes found in many high technology new 
ventures often provide innovation advantages (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Zahra, 2005). In 
turn, many of these innovative firms partner with more established firms that provide 
commercial resources associated with marketing and distribution (Rothaermel, 2001; 
Williamson, 1985). Perhaps investors perceive that new ventures with innovative 
technologies stand to benefit more from an alliance focused on commercializing those 
technologies (e.g., a marketing alliance) than from an alliance devoted to developing 
new technologies (e.g., a technology alliance). Similarly, investors may perceive that 
firms with especially valuable commercial resources could benefit by developing 
valuable technologies through a technology alliance. The positive effect of new venture 
advertising intensity in one of the full technology alliance models is limited evidence in 
support of this argument.  This logic is consistent with the argument that 
complementarity is more likely when firms contribute different, rather than similar or 
consistent, resources (Harrison et al., 1991; Hitt et al., 2001a). Research in this area 
suggests that similarity enhances existing strengths and weaknesses, perhaps creating 
redundancies as well, whereas differences offer more possibilities for synergies. 
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Building on earlier research discussing the benefits of complementarity in alliances 
(Harrison et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2000; Luo, 2002a), future work that approaches 
investor reactions to marketing and technology alliances from the perspective of 
complementarity, rather than signal consistency only, might help address these issues. 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 argued that new ventures CARs would be higher upon a 
marketing or technology alliance announcement when there was more uncertainty 
associated with the new ventures. The logic is based on well-established arguments from 
signaling theory that signals of quality are more valuable information tools when there is 
more uncertainty about that quality (Janney & Folta, 2006; Lee, 2001; Sanders & Boivie 
2004). Uncertainty was measured using firm age and size. The former was supported in 
one of the models in the marketing alliance subsample and the latter was supported in 
one of the models from the technology alliance subsample.  
Although signals may be more valued as uncertainty increases, it is possible that 
forming marketing or technology alliances adds to the uncertainty confronting investors. 
Indeed, many alliances fail to produce the desired results (Inkpen, 2001; Ireland et al., 
2002). Moreover, there is evidence that investors are sometimes cautious regarding new 
ventures heavily dependent on technology because of its unpredictable nature (Heeley et 
al., 2007). Using similar logic, it is possible that investors are also wary of some 
marketing alliance activities, as their outcomes can also be difficult to predict. For 
instance, aggressive marketing tactics may expose a firm to harmful retaliation from 
other firms (Chen, Smith, Grimm, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994). Likewise, as noted, the 
resource-base of small and young firms may make them especially vulnerable to the 
downsides of alliances, perhaps causing some investors to react negatively. Lastly, 
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perhaps the process of undergoing an IPO and the associated media attention (Pollock et 
al., 2008; Ravasi & Marchisio, 2003), coupled with the age and size of the sampled firms 
(means were 10 years old and $1.407 billion, respectively) at the time of the alliance 
announcements, has alleviated some of the uncertainty associated with these firms, 
thereby reducing the importance of signaling through alliance formation. 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 posited that new venture CARs would increase as the new 
venture’s alliance experience increases. These hypotheses were not supported. Scholars 
studying alliance experience have cautioned, not only that experience itself is an 
inadequate reflection of learning (Levinthal & March, 1993), but also that managers may 
sometimes over-generalize experiences acquired in one alliance to situations confronted 
in subsequent alliances (Zollo et al., 2000). This possibility is analogous to the argument 
that entrepreneurs often construct expectations by inaccurately generalizing from small 
samples (Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes, & Hitt, 2008). Thus, some scholars studying 
alliance experience have noted that partner-specific experience may be a better predictor 
of performance outcomes than is general alliance experience (Sampson, 2005; Zollo et 
al., 2002).  
Additionally, to the extent that prior alliance experience includes alliances that 
remain active, the number of prior alliances may be capturing the extent to which the 
new venture’s alliance management capabilities are being extended, as there are limits to 
the number of alliances firms can effectively operate (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2006). Moreover, this measure captured alliances from the year 2001 until the 
date of the announcement. As such, the data were left censored, introducing error into 
the measure. Finally, because experience in one domain may be difficult to transfer to 
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another domain (Hatch & Dyer, 2004), it is possible that investors perceive that prior 
marketing alliances primarily prepare a firm to succeed in other marketing alliances. 
Likewise, investors may perceive that technology alliances provide important learning 
opportunities for future technology alliances. Because the general alliance experience 
variable used herein is not segmented by alliance type, such possibilities are not 
observable. However, the argument that investors believe the benefits of alliance 
experience are confined to similar alliances should be studied more thoroughly in future 
research. 
Finally, Hypotheses 11 and 12 posited that complementarity enhances the effect 
of marketing and technology alliance announcements on new venture CARs. Though the 
benefits of complementarity are well-established theoretically (as discussed above), 
perhaps measuring this variable with a coarse-grained dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the partners are in different 3-digit SIC codes was inadequate. Indeed, 
rather than complementarity, this measure might reflect strategic alliances that represent 
diversification efforts by the partnering firms. Furthermore, scholars have previously 
criticized the shortcomings of SIC codes for measuring a firm’s resource endowment 
(Robins & Wiersema, 1995). A better measure might be the differences in specific 
resource endowments of the respective firms, proxied by difference scores on important 
resource expenditures, as these differences indicate the potential for complementarity 
(e.g., Harrison et al., 1991). However, because commercial resources and R&D 
resources were already included in the model, I hesitated to include a difference score 
across these measures as an additional variable.  
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Nonetheless, given these results and the aforementioned possibility that investors 
might be responding to complementarity rather than consistency, perhaps reconstructing 
the theory and analysis to examine this possibility deserves further discussion. In 
addition to capturing differences in resource endowments, measures of resource 
complementarity based on survey questions (e.g., Luo, 2002a), policy capturing (e.g., 
Hitt et al., 2000), and detailed evaluation of firm resource endowments (e.g., Dussauge, 
Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000) and market positions (e.g., Gulati, 1995) are recommended. 
These approaches could provide ordinal or continuous measures quantifying how 
different the two firms’ resource endowments are, which is preferable to the current 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firms compete in different industry 
segments. 
 Importantly, other comments on the study as a whole deserve attention. Although 
the dichotomy between marketing alliances and technology alliances is well-established 
in the literature, it is possible that many alliances cross these categories and perform 
activities consistent with both. Rather than focus on the separation between these two 
alliance types based on the activities performed, more precisely delineating the alliance 
management context based on other factors may be a fruitful way to approach future 
research in this area. Indeed, the scope of activities included in otherwise similar 
alliances can vary (Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). In future 
research, perhaps scholars could evaluate samples of marketing and technology alliances 
as a whole, rather than in two subsamples, and then predict abnormal returns in a manner 
similar to that used herein. Moreover, instead of focusing on the coarse-grained 
conceptualization and measurement of signal consistency, more rigorous theorizing to 
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explain what investors do and do not value in new venture alliance announcements could 
be especially useful. Given the limited results that investors consider complementarity, 
perhaps research in this area would be a good starting point. Additionally, SDC data 
contains some irregularities, such as inaccurate alliance coding and estimated 
announcement dates. Indeed, approximately one fourth of the sampled alliances had an 
alliance date that was estimated in the SDC database. In event studies, specification of 
the event time is important, as the technique relies on the event occurring to construct 
the dependent variable and is therefore weakened by imprecision around the focal event 
(Bromiley et al,. 1988; McWilliams & Siegel, 1995). In response, some scholars have 
begun making considerable adjustments to the data before using them in fine-grained 
analysis (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Future research using SDC data would be well-
advised to consider such issues. Finally, the lack of robust results may reflect the high 
multivariate multicollinearity among the independent and control variables, especially 
those denoting a firm’s industry. 
 In addition, it may be that investors are responding to different variables than 
those studied herein. For instance, the scope of activities performed in the alliance and 
the governance structures employed to manage such activities may also be important to 
investors, as each potentially influences the resources made available and the likelihood 
of opportunism (Li et al., 2008; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Further, as alliance 
management is critical to performance (Ireland et al., 2002; Rothaermel, 2001), perhaps 
investor responses to alliance formation by new ventures depend on signals regarding 
partner cooperation. Because the benefits of alliances depend greatly on inter-partner 
cooperation built over time (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), future work 
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approaching these questions from organizational learning (Mowery, Oxley, & Sampson, 
1996), social capital (Koka & Prescott, 2002), and transaction costs perspectives (Luo, 
2002b) are warranted. For similar reasons, future research examining accounting based 
and market based performance metrics over longer periods of time are recommended 
(e.g., Kale et al., 2002; Sorescu, Shankar, & Kushwaha, 2007). 
Finally, perhaps the relationships shown in Figure 1 are more complex than those 
hypothesized. For instance, based on prior arguments, a partner’s R&D resources can 
indicate a bargaining power advantage in technology alliances, and this advantage may 
be more likely when that partner is a large firm and the new venture is a small firm. As 
such, rather than the direct effects modeled herein, perhaps a partner’s R&D resources 
interact with its size to influence investor perceptions. Similarly, rather than focusing on 
each firm’s size independently, perhaps the moderator is the relative difference in size 
between the firms, as this can indicate the potential for opportunism (Alvarez & Barney, 
2001; Hamel, 1991). Finally, the context in which signaling occurs influences the 
information communicated by a signal (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Ndofor & Levitas, 
2004). Thus, future research might consider industry and other environmental 
moderators that affect the information alliances signal (e.g., Madhavan & Prescott, 1995; 
Park & Mezias, 2005). 
Conclusions 
 The resources accessed through alliances may sometimes provide useful signals 
to investors about a new venture’s performance potential. As noted, observing signaling 
and understanding the information that is signaled are not synonymous. Similarly, 
although arguments presented throughout suggest that alliances facilitate access to 
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resources, our knowledge of the signals associated with this access is incomplete. In 
response, my theory integrated arguments from signaling theory and resource-based 
theory on strategic alliances. Though support for the hypothesized effects was limited, 
this study contributes to our knowledge in at least three respects. 
 The first contribution is based on the two hypotheses concerning the benefits of 
endorsement and gaining access to resources for new ventures about which there is 
uncertainty and on the two concerning the benefits of endorsement and gaining access to 
the resources of large firms. In general, there was limited support for the first two 
hypotheses and no support for the second two hypotheses. As noted, it is possible that 
marketing and technology alliances enhance investor uncertainty in some respects. Also, 
undergoing an IPO and the age and size of the sampled firms may have reduced the 
importance of signaling in this context. Regarding the benefits of partnering with large 
partners, consistent with research suggesting that the value of increasingly large size is 
limited and perhaps disadvantageous (Hitt et al., 1997; Lu & Beamish, 2004), investors 
may also perceive that partnering with large firms has shortcomings. Alternately, in 
identifying how the value of an alliance with a particular partner serves as either an 
endorsement or a signal of access to large resource endowments, the study’s results 
suggest that investors consider factors other than large size (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999).  
 The second contribution is based on the predictions that prior alliance formation 
would provide investors a history of signals on which to evaluate subsequent alliances 
and would also be a source of knowledge and skills pertaining to alliance management. 
The lack of support for these hypotheses may suggest that investors consider general 
alliance experience unimportant. However, both Anand and Khanna (2000) and Kale et 
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al. (2000) found evidence that experience produces beneficial learning effects that 
enhances the value of subsequent joint ventures. Conversely, Zollo et al. (2002) 
identified no benefits of general alliance experience, and both Hoang and Rothaermel 
(2005) and Sampson (2005) found evidence of diminishing returns to experience. The 
learning literature cautions that the tendency to over-generalize experience from one 
learning event to the next increases the value of different but related experience (Ahuja 
& Lampert, 2001; Holcomb et al., 2008; Levinthal & March, 1993). Thus, through 
clearly speculative, perhaps investors attend to prior experience with a marketing or 
technology alliance when evaluating the potential of the respective alliance 
announcements. Alternately, it is possible to speculate that the returns to experience are 
indeed curvilinear such that early increases in experience raise market returns whereas 
later increases are less valued or discounted.  
The third contribution is based on earlier arguments that signal consistency and 
partner resources similar to those accessible through an alliance would enhance the value 
of the signal and provide positive information to investors evaluating recently public 
new ventures. Four hypotheses predicted relationships among partners’ resources and 
those accessible through the alliance. The only significant evidence in support of these 
four hypotheses is that a partner’s new product introductions per year are positively 
related to the CARs associated with a marketing alliance announcement. However, 
analysis of the control variables reveals some support for a positive relationship between 
new venture R&D resources and the CARs associated with a marketing alliance, 
suggesting that investors may also value complementarity with respect to the partners’ 
resources and the activities associated with the alliance. In the technology alliances, 
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there was limited evidence both in support and in contrast to complementarity. Although 
the two hypotheses about complementarity produced no statistically significant results, 
the measure was based more on participating in different industry segments than on the 
partner’s actual resources. Thus, in addition to the possible benefits of consistency and 
similarity, there is tentative evidence that investors also consider complementarity when 
evaluating alliance formation by new ventures.  
  In sum, this research analyzed investor reaction to marketing and technology 
alliance announcements from an integrated perspective based on signaling theory and 
resource-based theory on strategic alliances. The study’s hypothesized and non-
hypothesized results, as well as the lack of support for many variables, add to our 
knowledge of investor reaction to the strategic alliances formed by new ventures and 
suggest implications that could facilitate future research in this area. Hopefully, this 
dissertation will be a catalyst for such inquiry. 
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